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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 containedformer President
Trump's signature economic development initiative: the Opportunity
Zone program. Allowing a deferral of capital gains tax for certain
qualifying investments in low-income areas, the Opportunity Zone
program aims to spur economic development by steering capital into
economically distressed neighborhoods. The program is the latest
iteration of an overly simplistic market-basedapproachto community
development an approach that transcendspoliticalparty-based on
a flawed yet enduringnotion that mere proximity of capital will solve
deeply entrenched issues ofpoverty and racialinequity. In reality, the
legacy of Opportunity Zones is likely to be one of accelerated
neighborhood gentrification left in the wake of wealthy taxpayer

windfalls.
Opportunity Zones are more akin to a classic tax shelter than an
effective anti-poverty strategy. They share afundamental DNA with a
much older real estate-relatedtax break, § 1031 like-kind exchanges,

which allow for the nonrecognition of gains for certain qualifying
transactionsthat involve trading one piece of real estate for another.
Section 1031 is one of the largest corporate tax expenditures in the
U.S. tax code. Yet, as examined in this Article, the four primary
theoretical bases upon which § 1031 rests measurement,
administrability, liquidity, and economic stimulus have eroded over
time and are ultimately unpersuasive.
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Redirecting the value of the Opportunity Zone program and

§ 1031 exchanges to the Housing Choice Voucher program could
roughly double the number ofhousing vouchers availableto extremely
low-income households in the United States. I argue that this sort of
intervention would have far greater impact in addressing the ills of
poverty and racialinequalityin the UnitedStates than the Opportunity
Zone program. This argument is timely in light of President Biden's

recent supportfor reforming Opportunity Zones, limiting § 1031, and
expanding the Housing Choice Voucher program.
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INTRODUCTION

"

"My Admin has done more for the Black Community than any President
since Abraham Lincoln. Passed Opportunity Zones with
@SenatorTimScott, guaranteed funding for HBCU's, School Choice,
passed Criminal Justice Reform, lowest Black unemployment, poverty,
and crime rates in history. . ..
-Donald

Trump, Twitter, June 2, 20201

Among the achievements touted by former President Trump during his

presidency, one of the most frequent was the passage of a relatively arcane

1. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 2:27 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonald trump/status/1267885675338219520?lang-en [https://penna.cc/2NBFE8DB].
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addition to the U.S. tax code: the Opportunity Zone program. 2 Held up as his
signature economic development initiative, the program was intended to spur
investment in economically distressed communities by providing a variety of
incentives for taxpayers to invest capital gains in those neighborhoods. Estimates
projected that the program could tap into more than $6 trillion in unrealized
gains. 3 By September 2020, Opportunity Zone funds had already raised more
than $12 billion, approximately 96 percent of which went to investment in real
estate projects. 4 The unexpectedly strong investor demand led the Joint
Committee on Taxation to revise its estimate of the program's cost to the federal
treasury upward on multiple occasions.5
Trump received praise for the program from unlikely quarters 6 and missed
no opportunity to celebrate what it would mean for those living in low-income
communities.7 To dramatize the point, he invited Tony Rankins, a formerly

2. The program was enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. See Pub. L. No.
115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 2183-84 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2). Trump
frequently referenced Opportunity Zones throughout the 2020 presidential election cycle. See, e.g.,
PresidentialDebate at Belmont University in Nashville, Tennessee, COMM'N ON PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-222020-debate-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/MG2V-SVXN] ("Nobody has done more for the Black
community than Donald Trump . . with the . . possible exception . . of Abraham Lincoln....
Criminal justice reform, prison reform, opportunity zones with Tim Scott, a great senator from South
Carolina. He came in with this incredible idea for opportunity zones. It's one of the most successful
programs. People don't talk about it. Tremendous investment is being made. Biggest beneficiary, the
Black and [Latinx] communities .... ").
3. OpportunityZones: Tapping into a $6 Trillion Market, ECON. INNOVATION GRP. (Mar. 21,
2018), https://eig.org/news/opportunity-zones-tapping-6-trillion-market [https://perma.cc/7N8C-2994].
4. See Michael Novogradac, Novogradac Opportunity Funds List Surpasses $12 Billion in
Investment,
NOVOGRADAC
(Sept.
1,
2020),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-fromnovogradac/novogradac-opportunity-funds-list-surpasses-12-billion-investment
[https://perma.cc/6PL7-N5FU].
5.
Compare STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE
EFFECTS OF THE "TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT," As PASSED BY THE SENATE ON DECEMBER 2,2017, JCX-

63-17, at 6 (2017) (estimating a cost of $6.6 billion for the years 2019-2022, or approximately $1.65
billion per year), and STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022, JCX-81-18, at 27 (2018) (estimating a cost of $7.9
billion for the years 2019-2022, or approximately $1.98 billion per year), with STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 20192023, JCX-55-19, at 26 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 JCT TAX EXPENDITURES ESTIMATES] (estimating a
cost of $13.7 billion for the years 2019-2022, or approximately $3.43 billion per year).
6. For example, in late October 2020, Van Jones, former Special Advisor on Green Jobs to
President Obama, could be seen on CNN praising Trump for Opportunity Zones as evidence that he has
done "good stuff for the [B]lack community." See Anthony Leonardi, Van Jones: Trump's 'Incendiary'
Messaging on Race PreventsHimfrom Getting Creditfor 'GoodStuff' He 's Donefor Black Community,
WASH. EXAM'R (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/van-jones-trumpsincendiary-messaging-on-race-prevents-him-from-getting-credit-for-good-stuff-hes-done-for-blackcommunity [https://perma.cc/Y7Y4-JV6T].
7. At an April 2019 meeting of the newly constituted White House Opportunity and
Revitalization Council, Trump stated:
The Council will focus its efforts on economically distressed communities across the country,
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homeless African-American veteran, to the 2020 State of the Union Address.8
Rankins received a rousing standing ovation for reportedly turning around a life
mired in drug addiction as a result of finding a construction job created by the
Opportunity Zone program. 9 Subsequent reporting revealed that Rankins had in

fact started the job four months before Opportunity Zones were designated and
that the location of his employment fell outside of any Opportunity Zone.' 0
Anecdotal fudging, however, is not what is most problematic about the
Opportunity Zone program. Nor is the primary problem the rampant instances of

fraud, abuse, political favors, and lack of oversight and accountability that have
plagued the program, as will be highlighted herein." This is not a story of bad
apples. Rather, the core problem is that the Opportunity Zone program is based

on a deeply flawed yet enduring notion that mere proximity of capital to lowincome neighborhoods alone will solve deeply entrenched issues of poverty and
racial inequity. In reality, the legacy of Opportunity Zones is likely to be one of
accelerated neighborhood gentrification with little public value gained in
exchange for significant taxpayer windfalls.
I argue that at root the Opportunity Zone program is less akin to an effective
anti-poverty strategy and rather shares a fundamental DNA with another
provision of the Internal Revenue Code: § 1031 "like-kind exchanges."1 2 This
one hundred-year-old feature of the tax code allows a taxpayer to defer
including Opportunity Zones which are, as you know, up and running and doing incredibly
well, beyond expectation which we are [sic] designated by our nation's governors under a
crucial provision of our new tax cuts. That was a part of what we got approved with the tax
cut. And I don't know that people talk about it, but it was very important.
We're providing massive tax incentives for private investment in these areas to create jobs
and opportunities where they are needed the most. This is all throughout the country....
Our actions will directly improve the lives of countless low-income Americans. It's pretty
much aimed at that.
Together we can lift up every forgotten community. And we talked about the forgotten men
and women. And a lot of people were forgotten in this country. No longer. And unleash the
boundless potential of our people.
Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump at the White House Opportunity and
Revitalization Council Meeting (Apr. 4, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-white-house-opportunity-revitalization-council-meeting/
[https://perma.cc/J6NB-6M79].
8.

See Bernard Condon, Trump's Story About Veteran's Comeback Was Not Quite True,

ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-us-news-ap-top-newsweekend-reads-oh-state-wire-2722fe07cc220914f6772272e15b0c6d
[https://perna.cc/FNP2-8JJW].
Trump's introduction of Rankins: "Opportunity Zones are helping Americans like Army veteran Tony
Rankins from Cincinnati, Ohio. After struggling with drug addiction, Tony lost his job, his house and
his family. He was homeless. But then Tony found a construction company that invests in Opportunity
Zones. He is now a top tradesman, drug-free, reunited with his family, and he is here tonight." Full
Transcript: Trump's 2020 State of the Union Address, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/state-of-union-transcript.html

[https://perma.cc/XDD5-9RPC].
9.
10.
11.
12.

See Condon, supra note 8.
See id.
See infra Part I.B.
26 U.S.C. § 1031.
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recognition of gains associated with the exchange of real property for other real
property of "like kind."1 3 A side-by-side comparison of Opportunity Zones and
§ 1031 exchanges is revealing. While adorned in the ornamental language of
economic development, the Opportunity Zone program is in many respects

simply a dressed-up cousin of the § 1031 provision: a tax shelter with various
economic pros and cons to be analyzed by the taxpayer. Nothing in this analysis,
or in the resulting investment, requires the creation of any local jobs, the
involvement or support of any community-based organizations or disadvantaged
businesses, or the development of any needed community assets.
Unlike Opportunity Zones, § 1031 is not explicitly justified as an antipoverty tool. Instead, the law has been supported using four competing rationales

related to: (1) challenges of measuring gain in exchange transactions, (2)
administrative costs, (3) investor liquidity issues, and (4) the goal of promoting

economic activity." I argue that each of these rationales is lacking. In many
cases, they have been diminished by amendments made to § 1031 over time that,
for example, now allow for non-simultaneous exchanges or that limited the
provision to cover only real property transactions. Even the economic activity

rationale, the most formidable, does not apply to a wide variety of § 1031
transactions, overlooks other features of the tax code that already provide
significant investment incentives, and pays insufficient attention to the
fundamental nature of the federal income tax structure that attempts to balance
economic activity with other important public values.
In this Article, I consider one of those other public values-namely, the
need for decent and affordable housing. The COVID-19 global pandemic, and
associated concerns about housing instability left in its wake, has merely
magnified a reality that existed well before the virus arrived: that millions of U.S.
households are severely cost-burdened, struggling to afford housing in an
economy in which wages have not kept pace with increasing rents-a reality
even more severe for low-income households and households of color." While
short-term interventions are necessary to stem the fallout from the pandemic,
longer-term structural changes are necessary to address these underlying housing
challenges.
One proposal that has garnered significant support in recent years,

including from President Biden, is to expand coverage of the "Section 8"
Housing Choice Voucher program, currently the primary federal rental
assistance program, to all eligible "extremely low-income households." While

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. § 1031(a)(1).
See infra Part II.C for a discussion of each of these rationales.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.B.1.
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the voucher program is far from perfect,' 7 it currently ensures the availability of
2.5 million units of affordable housing to more than five million residents every
year.1 8 Based on calculations drawn from data available through the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), I estimate that
redirecting the value of the Opportunity Zone and § 1031 exchange tax

expenditures to the Housing Choice Voucher program could roughly double the
number of vouchers available to extremely low-income households.1 9 By some
estimates, this would be nearly sufficient to cover all such households in need.20
While vouchers emphasize a people- rather than place-based approach to
economic development, research described herein has found evidence that
vouchers, when utilized to provide access to "high-opportunity neighborhoods,"
are correlated with significantly improved economic outcomes. 2 1 Given that 50

percent of housing voucher holders have a Black head of household, 22 this holds
important implications for racial equity. While the goals of Opportunity Zones
and housing vouchers are not identical, Trump has touted the former primarily
on the basis of its expansion of economic opportunity for households of color.
Here, I do not attempt to settle the long-held debate over the relative merits of
people- versus place-based economic development interventions. 23 Rather, I

argue that when considering these specific programs, an expansion of housing
vouchers would better serve many of the ends ascribed to Opportunity Zones.
Though such a proposal to redirect the value of these tax expenditures
would no doubt face serious political opposition from, among others, certain real
estate industry advocacy groups, 24 recent debate around § 1031 shows that
movement is possible. In July 2020, then-candidate Biden laid out a tax plan that
would eliminate § 1031 exchanges for investors with annual incomes above
$400,000.25 Meanwhile, the renewed Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the

17.
See, e.g., PHILIP TEGELER, POVERTY & RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL, HOUSING CHOICE
VOUCHER REFORM: A PRIMER FOR 2021 AND BEYOND (2020), https://prrac.org/pdf/housing-choicevoucher-reform-agenda.pdf [https://penna.cc/E8WV-6DLZ] (noting limitations of the Housing Choice
Voucher program including discrimination by landlords against voucher holders, rent caps limiting
where households can live, and barriers to inter-jurisdictional use).
18.
OFF. OF POL'Y RSCH. & DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., ASSISTED HOUSING:
NATIONAL AND LOCAL: PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS (2020) [hereinafter PICTURE OF

SUBSIDIZED
HOUSEHOLDS
[https://perma.cc/A6YN-QWBZ].
19. See infra Part III.B.1.
20. See infra Part III.B.1.
21. See infra Part III.B.1.

2020],

https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html

22.
23.

PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS 2020, supranote 18.
See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-GentrificationOrigins of Place-BasedInvestment
Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community OrientedReform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745,785-86 (2019)

(discussing the historical distinction made between people-based and place-based strategies).
24. See infra Part III.B.2.
25. See Patrick Clark, John Gittelsohn & Noah Buhayar, What Is the Like-Kind Exchange Rule
That
Biden
Wants
Dead,
WASH.
POST
(July
27,
2020),
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wake of the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, among others,
have galvanized organizing around campaigns to redirect resources toward social
goods and services like housing assistance.
Such a proposal will also face certain challenges related to deeply ingrained
psychological human tendencies to hold individuals responsible for situational
outcomes, and to defend and rationalize the status quo, even by those it
disadvantages. 26 Overcoming such challenges will require raising awareness and
empathic understanding of the ways in which, though less visible, a large swath
of society already lived under highly constrained circumstances even prepandemic. While perhaps not as psychologically satisfying, direct aid, for
example to those with disabilities or the elderly, is a necessary complement to
economic development initiatives aimed at leveraging market forces to foster job
growth.

This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview and a critique
of the Opportunity Zone program through exploration of its underlying ideology
and of various proposals to reform the program. Part II examines the § 1031 likekind exchange provision, draws a comparison with the Opportunity Zone

program, and argues against the four primary rationales used to justify the tax
expenditure. Part III analyzes housing affordability challenges, proposes
redirecting the cost of Opportunity Zones and

§ 1031 exchanges to expand the

Housing Choice Voucher program to cover all extremely low-income
households, and considers the political and psychological challenges to adopting
this proposal.
Each of these three primary Parts is connected to one another, though in a
different manner and for differing purposes. Parts I and II provide a juxtaposition
of two real estate-related tax expenditures-Opportunity Zones and § 1031-for
the purpose of revealing insights about the former's fundamental tax shelter
orientation. Parts I and III combine to show how a major expansion of federal
rental assistance would better serve the Opportunity Zone program's purported

poverty alleviation goals, particularly for households of color. And Parts II and
III demonstrate one method of feasibly funding such an expansion in a manner
that is cost neutral to the federal government-namely, targeting § 1031, a tax
expenditure large enough to cover the cost of the proposal-in a fashion not
unlike prior housing advocacy campaigns. 27 This last move is offered in part as

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-isthe-like-kind-exchange-rule-that-biden-wantsdead/2020/07/24/daf373bc-cddd-1lea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html [https://perma.cc/XA9L-JF9U]
("Former Vice President Joe Biden, who is challenging Trump for the presidency in November, has
proposed eliminating the [§ 1031] loophole.").
26. See infra Part III.B.3.
27. See, e.g., UNITED FOR HOMES, NAT'L Low INCOME HOUS. COAL., REFORMING THE
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION: How TAX REFORM CAN HELP END HOMELESSNESS AND

HOUSING
POVERTY
(2017),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/MID-Report_0817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7J3-DMEJ] (arguing for limits to the home mortgage interest deduction in order to
help fund, for example, the National Housing Trust Fund).
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an actual substantive policy proposal and in part simply as one example of how
low-income housing advocacy groups might leverage additional resources by
paying greater attention to the tax code.

I.
THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROGRAM

A.

Basic Mechanics

The Opportunity Zone program provides three distinct federal tax

incentives for investors with capital gains to invest those gains in a Qualified
Opportunity Fund (QOF). 28 The first is a tax deferral mechanism. It allows
investments in QOFs to be excluded from gross income until the earlier of the
taxable year in which the investment is sold or 2026.29 This allows the investor
to defer payment of capital gains tax and thus bestows a time value of money
advantage.
The second incentive is a direct reduction in capital gains tax owed. If the
investment in the QOF is held for at least five years, then the basis in the
investment is increased by 10 percent of the amount of deferred gain. 30 For
example, if an investor transfers $1 million in capital gains into a QOF and holds
the investment for at least five years, then only $900,000 of gains ultimately are
recognized for tax purposes. A separate provision allows for an additional 5

percent basis increase, for a total of 15 percent, if the investment is held for at
least seven years.3m
The third incentive allows investors the ability to avoid paying capital gains
taxes altogether on the appreciation in value of the QOF investment.3 2 The
investment must be held for ten years in order to take advantage of this benefit.33
So if an investor holds a $1 million QOF investment for ten years and the value
of that investment increases by 60 percent, the investor ultimately would avoid
paying any capital gains taxes on the additional $600,000.

Combining these three federal tax benefits in a single investment can
impact rates of return enough to influence investor behavior. Consider the
following two scenarios. In June 2019, Investor A sold $1.5 million in stocks
with a basis of $500,000 for a capital gain of $1 million. Investor A did not invest

28. See generally26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d).
29. Id § 1400Z-2(a)(1), (b).
30. Id § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii).
31. Id § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv). Note that to take full advantage of this provision, the investment
must have been made by December 31, 2019, in order to be able to have held the investment for seven
years by December 31, 2026. There has been some discussion of extending this deadline. See, e.g.,
Opportunity Zone Extension Act of 2021, H.R. 970, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing an extension of the
realization deferral date to December 31, 2028); H.R. 6513,116th Cong. (2020) (proposing an extension
to December 31, 2030).
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(c).

33.

Id
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the gains in a QOF, so the gains will be included in gross income for taxable year
2019 and Investor A will owe federal capital gains tax.34 Applying the long-term
capital gains rate of 23.8 percent, 35 Investor A will pay $238,000, leaving
$762,000 in gains. Assume Investor A reinvests those gains in new stocks that
appreciate by 5 percent every year and holds the investment for ten years.3 6 At

the ten-year mark, the investment will be worth approximately $1.24 million.
Upon a sale, Investor A will pay capital gains tax on the appreciation in value,

resulting in after-tax proceeds from the sale of approximately $1.13 million. In
ten years, Investor A profited $130,000 on $1 million, a total return of 13 percent.

Alternatively, assume Investor B similarly gained $1 million on the sale of
stock in June 2019. Rather than buying more stocks, however, Investor B invests

the proceeds in a QOF within 180 days of the sale. 3 7 Investor B would pay no
tax on the gain in 2019. In taxable year 2026, Investor B would be forced to

recognize the deferred capital gains. However, having held the investment for
seven years, the gain would receive a 15 percent step-up in basis. The long-term

capital gains rate would be applied to only $850,000 of the original gain, for a
tax liability of $202,300.38 Assume again that the investment in the QOF
appreciates 5 percent every year and that the investment is held for ten years. 39
Unlike in the prior scenario, Investor B would pay no federal capital gains tax
on the appreciation of the investment. A sale of the QOF investment in 2029
would result in proceeds of approximately $1.63 million. Deducting the taxes
paid for taxable year 2026 yields a total return of roughly $1.43 million, or 43
percent over the original $1 million invested: 30 percent higher than in the prior
scenario. 40

These examples demonstrate that investing in a QOF can significantly
enhance an investor's after-tax returns. Furthermore, given the appreciation
exclusion mechanism, the magnitude of difference in returns between Investors
A and B increases the higher the annual rate of return or the longer the holding
period of the investment. The implementing regulations of the program allow an

34. This assumes no other available deferral options.
35. This calculation uses the capital gains rate of 20 percent for individuals with annual income
greater than the inflation-adjusted $425,800. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h). In addition, the calculation includes
the 3.8 percent net investment tax paid by many individuals with a modified adjusted gross income of
greater than $200,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
36. For purposes of simplicity, this assumes annual compound growth.
37. The Opportunity Zone program requires investment in a QOF within 180 days of the sale or
exchange generating the gain. See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A).
38. Note that in the intervening seven years, this $202,300 has been appreciating, bestowing the
time value of money advantage of the tax deferral incentive.
39. Note that this assumes the investor had other funds to use to pay the taxable year 2026 owed
taxes and thus did not need to cash out the QOF investment.
40. These examples ignore any other applicable taxes.
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investor to hold an investment in a QOF until 2047 and avoid paying capital

'

gains tax on any appreciation that occurs through the end of that year. 4
So what does the public receive in exchange for conferring these valuable
economic incentives? The answer relates to what QOFs can do with money
invested in them. Specifically, QOFs must invest in Qualified Opportunity Zones
(QOZs)-certain census tracts designated as low-income communities (LICs).
The program draws on the definition for LICs used by the New Markets Tax
Credit program, another place-based economic development program. 42 In order
to be deemed a LIC, the census tract must either (1) have a poverty rate of at
least 20 percent or (2) have a median family income below 80 percent of the
statewide and the metropolitan median family income. 43 In addition to LICs, the
program allows certain non-LIC tracts to be deemed QOZs so long as they are
contiguous with a QOZ-designated LIC and do not exceed 125 percent of the
contiguous QOZ-designated LIC's median family income. 44
Drawing upon 2011-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year

data from the Census Bureau, the U.S. Treasury Department released a list of
more than forty thousand census tracts eligible for potential QOZ status. 4 5 Only
25 percent of the eligible tracts in a given state could be designated as QOZs,
and of those, only 5 percent could consist of contiguous non-LIC tracts. 46 The
program empowered governors to nominate which of the eligible tracts in their
state would be designated as QOZs. Nominations were due by March 21, 2018,
for certification by the Treasury Department. In all, Treasury certified 8,764

census tracts as QOZs. 47
Not every investment in a QOZ is eligible to receive preferential tax
treatment under the Opportunity Zone program. Rather, the program sets forth

specific parameters for what sorts of investments qualify. Recall that investors
with capital gains do not invest directly in QOZs, but rather invest in a Qualified
Opportunity Fund. Such funds operate as investment vehicles organized for the
purpose of investing in, and holding 90 percent of their assets in, Qualified
Opportunity Zone Property (QOZP). 48 QOZP comes in one of two varieties: (1)

certain tangible property used in the trade or business of a QOF ("QOZ Business

41. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(c)-1(c) (2020) (specifying that an election to take advantage of
this incentive canbe made for disposition occurring through December 31, 2047).
42. See 26 U.S.C. § 45D(e).
43. Id § 45D(e)(1)(A)-(B). With respect to the second option, if the census tract is not located
in a metropolitan area, then the median family income only need not exceed 80 percent of the statewide
median income. Id § 45d(e)(1)(B)(i).

44.

26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(e)(1)(B).

45. See Rev. Proc. 2018-16, 2018-9 I.R.B. 383, 384 § 3.01.
46. Id at 383-84 § 2.09(1), (3). The rules provided a floor of twenty-five tracts per state. Id at
384 § 2.09(2).
47. Data spreadsheet downloaded from CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY,

OPPORTUNITY ZONE RESOURCES:

LIST OF DESIGNATED QUALFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONES

(2018), https://www.cdfifund.gov/opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/ZX2L-A366].

48.

26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1).
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Property") or (2) equity interests (stock or partnership interests) in certain

businesses located in a QOZ ("QOZ Business").4`
With respect to the former, a property must meet certain requirements to
qualify as QOZ Business Property. The tangible property must have been

purchased after December 31, 2017,50 the first use of the property in the QOZ
must be made by the QOF or the QOF must substantially improve the property,"
and "during substantially all of the [QOF's] holding period for such property,
substantially all of the use of such property [must be] in a [QOZ]." 5 2 These rules
are aimed at ensuring that the investment is bringing new resources into the area.
For investments in QOZ Businesses, the rules build on those for
investments in QOZ Business Property. The equity interest must have been

acquired with cash after December 31, 2017.53 At the time the interest was
acquired and for the substantial part of the fund's holding of the interest, the
entity must qualify as a QOZ Business. 54 In order to qualify, substantially all of
the tangible property owned by the business must be QOZ Business Property.55
The entity must derive a minimum of 50 percent of its gross income from the
active conduct of the business. 56 In addition, a number of typical "sin businesses"
are excluded from eligibility. 57

49.
50.

Id § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A).
Id § 1400Z-2 (d)(2)(D)(i)(I).
Id § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(i)(II). Property is considered "substantially improved" if "during

51.
any 30-month period beginning after the date of acquisition of such property, additions to basis with
respect to such property in the hands of the qualified opportunity fund exceed an amount equal to the
adjusted basis of such property at the beginning of such 30-month period in the hands of the qualified
opportunity fund." Id. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(ii). In other words, roughly speaking, a QOF must invest at
least as much money in improving the property as the cost of acquisition. The regulations clarified that
unimproved land is largely exempt from the substantial improvement requirement. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.1400Z2(d)-2(b)(4)(iv)(B) (2020). For acquisitions of buildings located in QOZs, the underlying land
acquisition costs are not included in the substantial improvement test calculation. Id § 1.1400Z2(d)2(b)(4)(iv)(A).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(i)(III). The regulations state that "substantially all" of the
holding period means 90 percent. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1(b)(6) (2020). The regulations state that
"substantially all" of the use of the property means 70 percent. Id. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1(b)(3).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(B)(i)(I) (for stock in a domestic corporation) and 26 U.S.C.
§ 1400Z-2(d)(2)(C)(i) (for partnership interests).
54. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(B)(i)(II)-(III) (for stock in a domestic corporation) and 26
U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(C)(ii)-(iii) (for partnership interests). The regulations state that "substantially
all" of the holding period means 90 percent. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1(b)(5) (2020).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(i). The regulations state that "substantially all" of the tangible
property means 70 percent. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(a)-1(b)(2) (2020).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii) (by reference to the Enterprise Zone statute at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1397C(b)(2)). The rules also require that "a substantial portion of the intangible property of such entity
is used in the active conduct of [the] business." 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii) (by reference to 26
U.S.C. § 1397C(b)(2)). The regulations state that a "substantial portion" of the intangible property
means 40 percent. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(d)(3)(ii) (2020).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(iii) (by reference to 26 U.S.C. § 144(c)(6)(B), excluding "any
private or commercial golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility,
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of
alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises").
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QOFs that meet these requirements must annually self-certify to the IRS. 58
Certain penalties accrue for failure to meet the above requirements. 59 After
publishing several rounds of proposed regulations, the IRS promulgated final
regulations implementing the program and clarifying a wide variety of technical
issues. 60 Among the clarifications contained in the regulations is a provision
stating that ownership and operation of real property qualify as actively
conducting a trade or business. 61
So here's how the program might work as envisioned by its proponents: a
number of investors pool their capital gains and collectively invest $50 million
in a Qualified Opportunity Fund. The QOF purchases real property like hotels,
office buildings, or mixed-use residential/retail developments located in
relatively lower-income census tracts that have been certified by the Treasury
Department as a Qualified Opportunity Zone. The QOF substantially improves
the properties, 62 investing significantly in rehabilitating and upgrading the

portfolio. Presumably, the improvement spurs job growth as local construction
workers and tradespeople, among others (architects, lawyers, accountants), are
required for the work. As the real property is improved, this has spillover effects
on the surrounding community as the enhanced properties draw higher-income
workers and residents with enhanced purchasing power to the area, which in turn
draw additional investment to the area. Property values rise, and, iteratively, the
cycle of investment, job growth, development, and luring of new resources
continues. The original QOF investors ultimately walk away with tax breaks as
compensation for carrying the risk of investing in perceived "riskier" lowincome communities and the formerly low-income communities enjoy new
economic vibrancy.
Or at least that's how the program was sold in 2017.
B.

Critiques

The reality of the Opportunity Zone program has, in many respects,

deviated significantly from the vision originally presented by its proponents.
Stories of outright fraud and abuse have filled the headlines of major news
outlets. Among them: A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went to a Rich GOP
Donor's Superyacht Marina;63 Welcome to the Greenbrier, the Governor-

58.

26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(a)(1) (2020).

59. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(f) (imposing a penalty on QOFs that fail to meet the
requirement of holding 90 percent of assets in QOZP).
60. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1400Z2(a)-1 to 1.1400Z2(f)-1 (released Dec. 19, 2019, effective Mar.
13, 2020).
61. Id. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1(d)(3)(iii)(A); Rev. Rul. 2018-29, 2018-45 I.R.B. 765.
62. See supra note 51 for a definition of "substantial improvement."
63. Justin Elliot, Jeff Emsthausen & Kyle Edwards, A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went
to

a

Rich

GOP

Donor's

Superyacht

Marina,

PRO

PUBLICA

(Nov.

14,

2019),

https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunity-zone-trump-tax-
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Owned Luxury Resort Filled with Conflicts of Interest;64 Symbol of '80s Greed
Stands to Profit from Trump Tax Break for Poor Areas;65 and Sununu
'OpportunityZone 'Picks Cause Stir.66 The articles detail governors politicizing

the choice of Opportunity Zone locations, favoring census tracts with heavy
investments by political allies, or in the case of the last article, a ski resort owned
by the governor's own family. Billionaires reap windfalls for real estate
investments that were already planned or located in or near affluent
neighborhoods.67
Of course, outright fraud and abuse are easy targets of critique. In January
2020, the Inspector General of the U.S. Treasury Department launched an
official inquiry into the program on the heels of reports of fraud. 68 Commentators

break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor [https://perma.cc/YCC5-SRVY] (detailing how an
area including a marina owned by Wayne Huizenga Jr. was designated as an Opportunity Zone
following Huizenga's direct appeal to Florida Governor Rick Scott). The article notes that Huizenga had
been a major donor to Governor Scott and discusses Huizenga's long-held plans to build luxury
apartments on the site, which also services superyachts, described as "floating mansions that can stretch
more than 300 feet and cost over $100 million." Id
64. Ken Ward Jr., Welcome to the Greenbrier,the Governor-OwnedLuxury Resort Filled with
Conflicts of Interest, PRO PUBLICA (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/west-virginiagreenbrier-governor-jim-justice-little-trump [https://penna.cc/EZ8V-48N3] (describing how West
Virginia Governor Jim Justice designated White Sulphur Springs an Opportunity Zone, a city that
included the Greenbrier, a "palatial resort" owned by Governor Justice).
65. Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Symbol of '80s Greed Stands to Profitfrom Trump Tax Break
for PoorAreas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/business/michaelmilken-trump-opportunity-zones.html [https://perma.cc/R78F-97MF] (describing how Michael Milken
lobbied his long-time friend, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, to personally intervene in the
Opportunity Zone designation process to ensure that Milken's investments in two major real estate
projects were covered, and outlining how Milken's think tank, The Milken Institute, was a "leading
proponent" of the original effort to enactthe Opportunity Zone program). For another article by the same
authors that received significant attention, see Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, How a Trump Tax Break to
Help Poor Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/ED7Q3XKM] (detailing, among other things, how "Sean Parker, an early backer of Facebook, helped come
up with the idea" of Opportunity Zones, which then drew support from Senators Cory Booker and Tim
Scott).
66. Ethan DeWitt, Sununu 'OpportunityZone 'Picks Cause Stir, CONCORD MONITOR (Dec. 14,
2019),
https://www.concordmonitor.com/Capital-Beat-New-Hampshire-Gov-Chris-Sununuopportunity-zone-picks-cause-stir-31263127 [https://perma.cc/X5XC-FYKW] (describing how New
Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu designated an Opportunity Zone area that included a ski resort
owned by his family).
67. See Howard Gleckman, Opportunity Zones May Someday Help Poor Communities. They
Are Already a Tax Shelter for High-Income Investors, TAx POL'Y CTR. (Sept.

5, 2019),

https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/opportunity-zones-may-someday-help-poor-communitiesthey-already-are-tax-shelter-high-income [https://perma.cc/Q8AA-2P2P] ("Opportunity Zones commit
one of the most egregious, and common, sins of tax policy. They provide incentives to encourage people
to do things they would have done anyway.").
68.

See Laura Strickler, Treasury'sInternal Watchdog Is Probingthe Trump Administration's

Opportunity Zone Program, NBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donaldtrump/treasury-s-intemal-watchdog-probing-trump-administration-opportunity-zone-programnl 116716?cid=sm npdnntwma [https://perma.cc/3HML-L8MB].
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have called for additional transparency. 69 As initially enacted, the Opportunity
Zone program did not contain any explicit mechanisms for gathering or sharing

data regarding what projects and businesses investors were using to claim the tax
incentives. 70 This has led to legislative proposals for enhanced oversight and
'

control mechanisms. 7

In many respects, however, the program has worked exactly as planned.
Pointing to particularly egregious examples and calling for greater oversight to

weed out the bad apples carries the implicit message that the foundation upon
which the program is built is fundamentally sound. And yet, it is not deviations
from the original vision that are the root problem. Rather, it is the fact that the
Opportunity Zone program is based on a deeply flawed, yet enduring, notion:

that mere proximity of capital alone will solve deeply entrenched issues of
poverty and racial inequity.
This notion is not unique to Republican administrations. Prior programs

developed and enacted by the Clinton administration, such as the New Markets
Tax Credit, which served as a model for certain features of the Opportunity Zone
program, were committed to a similar approach to poverty reduction. 72 An

assortment of federal and state interventions by both Republican and Democratic
administrations over the past several decades has utilized the same basic
approach: place-based economic incentives to support business growth and
development in low-income communities. 73
This model is based on an ideology that saw its most distilled explication
in the work of Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter in the 1990s. 74

69. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, OpportunismZones, 39 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 82 (2020)
(arguing for annual reporting requirements among other amendments to the Opportunity Zone program);
Victoria Lee, Opportunity Without Reach: The Problems with the Opportunity Zone Program and the

Needfor Clarification, Oversight, andRegulation, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (2019) (arguing that the
U.S. Treasury Department should implement monitoring systems and data collection).
70. The original Opportunity Zone bill would have required annual reporting commencing upon
the fifth year of enactment; however, this provision was not included in the version of the bill that
Congress passed. See De Barbieri, supra note 69, at 95 n.48.
71. See, e.g., Improving and Reinstating the Monitoring, Prevention, Accountability,
Certification, and Transparency Provisions of Opportunity Zones Act, S. 2994, 116th Cong. (2019)
(introduced by Senator Tim Scott).
72. See, e.g., Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics:
Toward a GrassrootsMovement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 428-29 (2001) ("In

addition, as part of a broader market-based CED policy initiative, Congress passed Clinton's New
Markets Tax Credit, which was designed to spur private sector equity investments in low-income
community businesses. These programs underscored Clinton's effort to align antipoverty policies with
his neoliberal economic agenda and marked the culmination of a two-decade-long ideological shift in
favor of market-based antipoverty strategies." (internal citations omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Layser, supranote 23 (discussing avariety of suchprograms, including Enterprise
Zones, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, Hope VI, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits,
and New Markets Tax Credits).
74. See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARv. Bus. REV.,
May-June 1995, at 55.
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Building on his research about the importance of clusters7 5 as a driver of
economic development, Porter foregrounded business development in
geographically discrete locations as the key to solving the "economic distress of
America's inner cities." 7 6 The solution, according to Porter, was to leverage
certain competitive advantages of central cities (i.e., central location, purchasing
power, local workforce, and proximity to other nearby economic activity) to spur
the growth of local business.77 This in turn would presumably fuel local job
growth and reduce other "crippling social problems." 7 8 The role of the private
sector was a simple one in Porter's view: "The most important contribution

companies can make to inner cities is simply to do business there." 7 9
Government was relegated to the secondary role of supporting the private sector
through infrastructure, transportation, environmental remediation, and crime
prevention. 80

Unfortunately, in the intervening years since Porter's writings, it has
become clear that stimulating local economic activity and solving entrenched
issues of poverty and racial inequity are not equivalent. This reality is at the core
of the conversation around gentrification that has been unfolding over the past
several decades in cities across the United States, as local advocates wrestle with
a central dilemma: how to ensure that the spoils of enhanced economic activity
accrue to the benefit of current residents. 8' Sensitive to the history of past
practices like redlining, which cut off credit to communities of color,
commentators are clear that some forms of investment and development must be
welcomed. 8 2 On the other hand, unbridled economic activity is equally

&

75. See id at 57 (defining "clusters" as representing "critical masses of skill, information,
relationship, and infrastructure in a given field").
76. Id at 55.
77. Id at 57-62.
78. Id at 55 (highlighting drug abuse and crime in particular).
79. Id at 65.
80. Id at 67-69.
81. For an early piece on gentrification, see Peter Marcuse, Gentrification,Abandonment, and
Displacement: Connections, Causes, andPolicy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB.
CONTEMP. L. 195, 198-99 (1985) (defining gentrification as "when new residents who
disproportionately are young, [W]hite, professional, technical, and managerial workers with higher
education and income levels replace older residents who disproportionately are low-income,
working-class and poor, minority and ethnic group members, and elderly from older and previously
deteriorated inner-city housing in a spatially concentrated manner, that is, to a degree differing
substantially from the general level of change in the community or region as a whole"). For a discussion
of modem questions in the gentrification literature, see Derek Hyra, Commentary: Causes and
Consequences of Gentrification and the Future of Equitable Development Policy, 18 CITYSCAPE 169,

171, 173 (2016) (noting research indicating high in- and out-migration rates of low-income residents
both in gentrifying and non-gentrifying neighborhoods, but emphasizing the specific relationship
between gentrification and a "shrinking supply of affordable housing," as well as the cultural and
political displacement effects of gentrification).
82.

See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF

How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (reviewing in detail the racist underwriting
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understood to pose a threat as, for example, rising property values may lead to
higher rents for homes and local small businesses.
Meanwhile, it has also become clear that local government can effectively
play its assigned role of helping to create local conditions most conducive to
enhanced business growth. It is not difficult to "beautify" an area through, for
example, the establishment of central business districts or enforcement of
punitive regimes criminalizing the homeless, which have become a fixture in
many cities around the country. 83 But if the result is an economically viable
district that has simply displaced marginalized populations, it forces one to pause
and ask the question: what exactly was the original purpose of the effort?
As a program that embraces Porter's core ideology in relatively pure form,
it is unsurprising that the Opportunity Zone program has run into exactly these
questions. The program takes the central page out of Porter's playbook and

provides significant economic incentives for businesses to simply do business,
or as it is primarily playing out in this instance, purchase real estate, in lowincome communities. Unlike other place-based economic incentive programs,
and aside from the limitation on "sin businesses," there are essentially no
content-specific restrictions. The program does not require the production of

affordable housing or other needed goods or services. 84 The program does not
encourage the participation of any particular category of stewards in the
community, for example mission-driven community-based organizations. 85

Rather, any taxpayer that meets the requisite criteria can claim the tax benefits.
The program does not require that any jobs actually be created or that businesses
hire locally or engage in business with other pre-existing local businesses. 86 Nor

practices of the Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
in home mortgage lending and its long-term impact on residential racial segregation in the United
States); KEVIN Fox GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CIFY

EXPERIENCE, 1900-2010 (2014) (using Kansas City as a case study to describe a similar set of policies
and explore the "racialization of space").
83.
See NAT'L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES (2019), https://homelesslaw.org/wp-

[https://penna.ccIH7GV-V5C4]
content/uploads/2019/12/housing-not-handcuffs-2019-final.pdf
(surveying 187 cities and finding high and increasing incidences of ordinances criminally punishing
certain behavior, such as sitting and lying down in public, loitering or loafing, living in a vehicle,
begging, or food sharing).
84. Some might argue that to the extent investment is made in market-rate residential real estate,
it would have some beneficial "trickle down" impact on housing prices for low-income residents along
the lines predicted by the much-contested "filtering theory" of housing. See Note, Reassessing Rent
Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988)
(featuring Duncan Kennedy and Karl Case's rent control proposal, which complicates classic filtering
theory by considering neighborhood dynamics in a gentrifying market).
85. By contrast, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program includes a 10 percent set-aside
for non-profit developers. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5).
86. Compare this with the HUD Section 3 program, which "requires that recipients of certain
HUD financial assistance, to the greatest extent possible, provide training, employment, contracting and
other economic opportunities to low- and very low-income persons, especially recipients of government
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does the program give any preference to economically-disadvantaged, minority,
or women-owned business enterprises. 87
Given the permissive nature of the program rules, there are legitimate
concerns

about (1) the efficacy of the program in promoting economic

development of the sort that might help alleviate poverty and (2) the potential of
the program to do more harm than good. To the former concern, so long as a
Qualified Opportunity Fund complies with the metrics relating to holding
periods, substantiality of use and improvement, derivation of income, and so on,
then investors can fold up shop in five, seven, or ten years and claim the tax
benefits. The fact that census tracts can encompass a broad spectrum of
neighborhoods, coupled with the allowance for certain contiguous non-LIC
tracts, means that the investment need not even be in a low-income
neighborhood. While in some cases these investments may translate into
economic benefits for residents of the local community, it is possible to receive
all of the economic incentives of the Opportunity Zone program without creating
a single local job or producing anything of significant value to the local
community. 88

Early analysis of the new program has already yielded at least some
indication of its inability to substantially further programmatic goals of
"spur[ring]
economic development and job creation in distressed
communities." 89 Preliminary findings from one early study that examined job
postings and salaries in zip codes with and without Opportunity Zones found

assistance for housing, and to businesses that provide economic opportunities to low- and very lowincome persons." Section 3 - Economic Opportunities, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,

https://www.hud.gov/section3 [https://penna.cc/S924-JB4L].
87. See Edward W. De Barbieri,ExcludingDisadvantagedBusinesses, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV.
901 (2021) (discussing the history and current landscape with respect to state and federal preferences
for minority- and women-owned business enterprises).
88. See Matthew Rossman, Opportunity Knocking? Are Opportunity Zones a Model for a
SmarterFederalHomeowner Subsidy?, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 103, 119 (2019) (noting that "advocates for
economically distressed communities wonder if the jobs created in Opportunity Zones will actually fit
the skill sets of those who live in them and/or if the products and services the businesses offer match the
needs of QOZ residents"). This is not to argue that all Opportunity Zone investments would never
provide some economic boost to the local economy that is of benefit to local residents. For an example
of a description of a successful project that received opportunity zone financing, see Tracy A. Kaye,
Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and
Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1067 (2021),

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3895855
[https://perma.cc/Z22X-FU5K]
(describing a successful mixed-use project in the North Lawndale neighborhood of Chicago, though
also noting a variety of other financing sources, describing the active involvement of the Chicago
Housing Authority, and questioning whether the Opportunity Zone incentives are strong enough to
induce investment in such mission-driven projects).
89.
Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 15,
2020),
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/CQ72-8FJJ] ("Q4. What is the purpose of QOZs? A4. QOZs are an economic
development tool that is, they are designed to spur economic development and job creation in
distressed communities.").
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"limited effect on employment outcomes."90 Further analysis has concluded that
while the program has had the positive effect of bringing new investor
stakeholders into the field of community development, 91 approximately 96
percent of the funds were dedicated to real estate projects rather than investment
in operating businesses. 92 Brett Theodos, senior fellow at the Urban Institute and
author of one of the studies, noted that "[r]eal estate means construction jobs in
the short term, but . .. creating longer-term employment for local residents
requires starting businesses that produce goods and services." 93

Beyond simple inefficacy, there are legitimate concerns that the program
could in fact do damage to the communities the program is ostensibly designed
to help. Commentators have raised the specter of increased gentrification and
displacement.94 Michelle Layser has written about the pro-gentrification roots of
place-based tax benefits like the Opportunity Zone program and has argued that

90. See Rachel M. B. Atkins, Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Cristian Jana-Figueroa & Robert
Seamans, What is the Impact of Opportunity Zones on Employment? 12 (July 31, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673986 [https://perma.cc/6B5V38WJ]; see also Erick Trickey, The SurprisinglyLimited Success of Trump's Signature Anti-Poverty
Program,
POLITICO
MAG.
(Sept.
29,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/29/cleveland-opportunity-zones-422728
[https://perma.cc/9CAE-UPTF] (discussing the limited impact on job creation in Cleveland, Ohio).
91.
See BRETT THEODOS, ERIC HANGEN, JORGE GONZALEZ & BRADY MEIXELL, URB. INST.,
AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 5-10 (2020),

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/1023 48/early-assessment-of-opportunity-zonesfor-equitable-development-projects.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX4Q-Q2FZ] (noting that "the OZ incentive
has attracted interest from actors across the country" and in some cases had catalyzed coordination and
alignment of incentives for investors who traditionally had not been engaged in community
development).
92. See NOVOGRADAC, supranote 4 (noting $17.89 billion raised inthe residential, commercial,
and hospitality categories, as compared to only $442.2 million for operating businesses and $320.4
million for "renewables"; note that some of the funds are invested in multiple categories).
93. Laura Strickler & Blayne Alexander, Trump Is Touting Opportunity Zones as a Huge
Success
with
No
Proof,
NBC
NEWS
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-touting-opportunity-zones-huge-success-noproof-n1231546 [https://perma.cc/CGC3-4UHH] (reporting on an interview with Theodos).
94.

See Dan Weil, The Trump Administration Said These Tax Breaks Would Help Distressed

Neighborhoods.
Who's
Actually
Benefiting?,
WASH.
POST
(June
6,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/opportunity-zones-are-loaded-with-tax-benefits-but-willthey-actually-help-residents/2019/06/05/0f80elc6-7e68-11e9-8bb7Ofc796cf2ec0_story.html?noredirect-on&utm_term=.a4a8f66c96a8
[https://perma.cc/D9D4-J4T4]
(quoting Brett Theodos) ("The opportunity-zone incentive is most attractive [to investors] where assets
are appreciating most.... Where is that happening? It's in zones approaching gentrification. It could be
that the lion's share of investment goes to a minority of zones."); see also Adam Looney, Will
Opportunity Zones Help DistressedResidents or Be a Tax Cutfor Gentrification?,BROOKINGS (Feb.
26,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-helpdistressed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification [https://perma.cc/AY4T-YW8R] ("[A] state's
Opportunity Zones could . . serve as a subsidy for displacing local residents in favor of higher-income
professionals and the businesses that cater to them a subsidy for gentrification.").
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rather than being a flaw, gentrification is actually an intended feature. 95 Others
have written about the program's "fail[ure] to incentivize community
engagement" or "mitigate against displacement." 96 The economic incentives are

such that investment may be most likely to occur in those neighborhoods that are
already showing signs of gentrification. 97 One particularly onerous concern
relates to the recent trend of large corporations buying up single-family homes
from homeowners, converting them to rentals, and engaging in a variety of
exploitative practices to maximize return on investment. 98 Some worry that the
Opportunity Zone program could potentially fuel such speculation. 99 The upshot:

95. See Layser, supra note 23, at 788-89 ("Even the newest example of spatially oriented
indirect tax incentives-Opportunity Zones is best understood as having progentrification origins. At
the time when the tax law was introduced, the Trump Administration's primary focus was on creating a
favorable, pro-growth business environment. Given this political context, even some members of the
development community were skeptical of the program's objectives. One Maryland-based architect was
quoted by a trade news outlet saying, '[My] concern [is] that this strategy will result in gentrification on
steroids . .
The guidelines and regulations thus far show little concern for the effects of new
development on the existing blighted community. Focus should be on raising the quality of life for the
existing population of the blighted area through new development and also through the improvement of
consumer goods, and services where government falls short. Addressing social impact needs to be in the
guidelines."' (internal citations omitted)). Layser notes, "Most legal scholarship regards gentrification
as an unintended, regrettable consequence of place-based policies, not the hidden motivator.
Nevertheless, the rise of place-based investment tax incentives can be explained as a natural outgrowth
of state policies in support of private industry efforts to profit through gentrification." Id at 772.
96.
Bre Jordan, Denouncing the Myth of Place-Based Subsidies as the Solution for
Economically DistressedCommunities:An Analysis of OpportunityZones as a Subsidyfor Low-Income

Displacement, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 65, 66, 68 (2020) ("Unfortunately, wealthy investors are likely
to be the predominant beneficiaries of this legislation, and at the expense of low-income, minority
residents.").
97. See Lee, supra note 69, at 141 ("Even now, there is evidence that some designated
Opportunity Zones may already be on the road to gentrification and thus, may not require or benefit
from supplemental funding as much as other zones."); see also Weil, supra note 94; Hearing on the
2017 Tax Bill and Who ItLeft Behind: HearingBefore H. Comm. on Ways andMeans, 116th Cong. 44
(2019) (statement of Professor Nancy Abramowitz, American University Washington College of Law)
("[E]arly reports in the news and in industry suggest that some investment in [O]pportunity [Z]ones is
going into areas that are already gentrified, areas that may not benefit those who we would like to see
benefitted, and it may be a real challenge trying to target that investment properly."). It is of course the
case that gentrification is not of equal concern across all regions or across all neighborhoods within a

particular metropolitan area.
98. See Francesca Mari, A $60 Billion Housing Grab by Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar.
5,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.conV2020/03/04/magazine/wall-street-landlords.html
[https://perma.cc/X2SC-6QP6] ("By 2016, 95 percent of the distressed mortgages on Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac's books were auctioned off to Wall Street investors without any meaningful stipulations,
and private-equity firms had acquired more than 200,000 homes in desirable cities and middle-class
suburban neighborhoods, creating a tantalizing new asset class: the single-family-rental home. The
companies would make money on rising home values while tenants covered the mortgages.").
99. See E-mail from National Consumer Law Centerto BrandonM. Weiss (Oct. 31, 2019, 09:40
CST) (on file with author) (noting concerns about the potential for Opportunity Zones to "incentiviz[e]
predatory home equity theft").
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merely parking capital near poverty will not solve, and may exacerbate, deeply
entrenched social issues of poverty and racial inequity.1 00
But if not the Opportunity Zone program in its current form, then what?

Ted De Barbieri has argued persuasively for a number of reforms that would
improve the program, such as requirements ensuring greater transparency,
community participation in determining which projects are funded and in which

neighborhoods, and "use value" benefits to local residents.101 Regarding the
latter, a bill by Senator Ron Wyden would impose certain use restrictions on
Opportunity Zone incentives-for example, disallowing housing projects that do
not incorporate certain rent and income limits.10 2
Layser has proposed entirely replacing "spatially oriented investment tax
incentives," like the Opportunity Zone program, with a "community oriented

investment tax incentive."1 03 Such tax incentives would attempt to ensure that
local residents benefit, for example, by providing incentives to businesses that
prioritize local hiring, make donations to area nonprofits that provide important
local services, engage in projects with community benefits agreements
(CBAs),1 04 and involve local participation in project development.1 05
Rashmi Dyal-Chand's book on "collaborative capitalism" argued for,
among other interventions, greater support for grassroots social enterprises and
local businesses.1 06 Matt Rossman has proposed using the Opportunity Zone

program as a model for a direct tax credit to homeowners.107 Others have made
similar arguments regarding the need for a closer connection between
community development incentives and the communities they are intended to
serve. 108

These important proposals are all helpful contributions. To critique
Opportunity Zones is not to critique any place-based strategy or any strategy that

100. Another relevant concern is that Opportunity Zone investments may pull capital away from
other more beneficial investments that banks might otherwise have made to comply with Community
Reinvestment Act requirements.
101. See De Barbieri, supranote 69, at 127-31, 134-42.
102. See Opportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act, S. 2787, 116th Cong. (2019).
103. See Lay ser, supranote 23, at 760 ("Thus, in addition to being categorized as direct or indirect
tax subsidies, place-based investment tax incentives can also be categorized as community oriented (if
they contain features to benefit local residents) or spatially oriented (if they do not). At minimum, a
community oriented investment tax incentive must include some safeguard to prevent poor residents
from being harmed, while spatially oriented investment tax incentives lack such safeguards.").
104.

See Benjamin S. Beach, Strategiesand Lessonsfrom the Los Angeles Community Benefits

Experience, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 77 (2008).
105. See Layser, supra note 23, at 804-15.
106.
See RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE
REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018).

CAPITALISM IN

AMERICAN

CITIES:

107. See Rossman, supra note 88.
108. See, e.g., Joseph Bennett, Lands of Opportunity:AnAnalysisofthe Effectiveness andImpact
of OpportunityZones in the Tax Cuts andJobsAct of 2017, 45 J. LEGIS. 253, 271 ("Instead ofpromoting
generic, blanket economic growth, programs that target actual social change through tangible benefits
like money for schools, day cares, parks, community centers, etc., might accomplish more good in the
very communities that the Opportunity Zone program purportedly seeks to help.").
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attempts to channel market forces for the purpose of economic development and
poverty alleviation; to the contrary, such approaches are critically important. As
a complementary strategy, however, the current moment appears to be crying out

for more direct and immediate intervention, as will be taken up in Part III.B.
II.
SECTION 1031 LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES

A.

Basic Mechanics

By the end of 2026, the bulk of the financial incentives provided by the
Opportunity Zone program will have sunset.' 0 9 Yet lurking within the Internal

Revenue Code is a not so unrelated tax deferral mechanism, commonly known
as the § 1031 "like-kind exchange" provision." 0 Like the Opportunity Zone
program, § 1031 provides a tax deferral mechanism for certain gains. Unlike the
Opportunity Zone program, § 1031 is a permanent feature of the tax code-the
concept dates back to a provision passed as early as 1921,111 only eight years
after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment."1 2 And though there is some
uncertainty regarding the ultimate cost of the Opportunity Zone program, § 1031
is by most estimates a significantly larger tax expenditure; at an approximate cost

of $14 billion per year, it has been found by the Joint Committee on Taxation to
be the second largest corporate tax expenditure.I 3
Section 1031 operates as an exception to baseline principles of tax law.

Gain, for example from appreciation of stocks or a piece of real property, would
typically be considered "realized" for tax purposes upon sale or the exchange of
one investment for another."

4

Standard tax principles call for the gain to be

109. This assumes no extensions, like the one mentioned in note 31, are enacted. And the ability
to avoid paying taxes on the appreciation of the investment in the QOZ will be available for dispositions
made all the way until December 31, 2047. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(c)-1(c) (2020).
110. See 26 U.S.C. § 1031.
111. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c)(1), 42. Stat. 227, 230.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.").
113.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, JCX-

18-15, at 28 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 JCT TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES] (estimating a cost of $68
billion for the years 2014-2018, or $13.6 billion per year, and listing it second after only the deferral of
active income of controlled foreign corporations on the list of largest corporate tax expenditures).
114.
See WILLIAMD.POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION 48 (6thed. 2013) ("A taxpayerwho
retains appreciating property does not (under the statute) 'realize' gain as the property appreciates. This
paradigm suggests the following policies requiring realization as a statutory condition for imposing tax:
(1) Appreciation generates no cash to pay the tax.. .. (2) The taxpayer has not changed his investment.
(3) Valuation will be administratively difficult. All three ideas cluster together to make up the theme of
realization, but no one idea by itself is sufficient to prevent taxing gain. For example, a taxpayer who
exchanges a farm for a residence pays tax, even though it is difficult to value the assets and there is no
cash received. Realization does not usually occur, however, if the taxpayer retains the investment. This
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recognized and included in taxable income upon realization." 5 Section 1031,
however, allows a taxpayer to defer recognition of gains associated with the
exchange of property for other property of "like kind.""1 6 The Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 limited the set of property eligible for this favorable treatment to
real property." 7 While there is no definitive rule, most real property is
considered to be of "like kind" with other real property; for example, the
provision covers exchanges of unimproved property for improved property." 8

In order to qualify for the tax deferral provided by § 1031, both the original
and replacement real property must be "held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment" and not held primarily for sale.11 9 The IRS formerly
took the position that the exchange of property had to be simultaneous in order
to qualify as a § 1031 exchange.120 However, in Starker v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit held against the IRS on that point.121 In the wake of Starker,

suggests that the strongest of the policies which make up the realization requirement is the idea that it is
economically undesirable or in some sense, unfair to disturb ownership by taxing it, if the taxpayer
doesn't want to change ownership."); see also Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940) ("While it
is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need
not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset. Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property . .
or other profit realized from the completion of a transaction. The fact that the gain is a portion of the
value of property received by the taxpayer in the transaction does not negative its realization." (internal
citation omitted)).
115. See 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ("The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be
the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis .... ").
116. See id § 1031(a)(1) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of real property
held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such real property is exchanged solely
for real property of like kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment.").
117. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13303, 131 Stat. 2123 (striking the term "property" throughout
and replacing it with "real property"); see also Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Like-Kind
Exchanges Now Limited to Real Property (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/like-kindexchanges-now-limited-to-real-property [https://perma.cc/M24U-99KE] ("Effective Jan. 1, 2018,
exchanges of personal or intangible property such as machinery, equipment, vehicles, artwork,
collectibles, patents, and other intellectual property generally do not qualify for nonrecognition of gain
or loss as like-kind exchanges.").
118. See Forrest David Milder, A Brief Introduction to Like-Kind Exchanges of Real Estate
Under § 1031, 17 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 179, 185 (2008) ("Most real estate is likekind in relation to other real estate. For example, improved and unimproved real estate are like-kind.
The IRS and the courts have found a wide range of interests in property to be real estate, including the
exchange of interests in city real estate for a ranch or farm and exchanges where one or both of the
properties were cooperative housing corporations, conservation easements, condominiums, or water
rights.... A lease of a fee interest with thirty or more years to run is like-kind with a fee interest in real
estate. Interestingly, one court has held that the exchange of a fee interest in property already subject to
a ninety-nine-year lease could be exchanged like-kind for a fee interest." (internal citations omitted)).

119.

26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1)-(2).

120. See Milder, supranote 118, at 181.
121. Starker v. U.S., 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an exchange qualified under
§ 1031 where the property to be received could be designated by the transferor for up to five years after
the transaction, and even though the transferor could have potentially in the end received cash instead
of like-kind property).
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Congress incorporated a specific statutory timing framework into § 1031.122 The
current statute requires a taxpayer to have identified the replacement property

within forty-five days of transferring the relinquished property1 23 and to have
received the new property within 180 days of transferring the relinquished
property.1 24 Thus, the direct exchange of one property for another is no longer

necessary to take advantage of the provision-rather, "deferred" or "nonsimultaneous" exchanges are allowed so long as a taxpayer reinvests the
proceeds of a sale of real property into another piece of real property within the
required timeframe.1 25

The tax code addresses other relevant mechanics. The taxpayer's basis in
the acquired property is equal to the basis of the exchanged property, less cash
received as part of the transaction.1 26 Transfers between related parties are not
prohibited but trigger additional rules.1 27 And exchanges of domestic real
property for real property outside of the United States are explicitly excluded.1 28
A basic example of how the deferral mechanism works is instructive.
Suppose Taxpayer A buys a piece of unimproved raw land (Property 1) as an

122.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, JCX-41-84, at 244-45 (1984)

(discussing the policy rationale at length).
Congress was concerned that like-kind treatment of non-simultaneous exchanges had given
rise to unintended results as well as administrative problems. These concerns extended to the underlying
policy of the like-kind exchange rule.
The special treatment of like-kind exchanges has been justified on the grounds that a
taxpayer making a like-kind exchange has received property similar to the property relinquished and
therefore has not effectively "realized" a profit on the transaction. This rationale is less applicable in the
case of deferred exchanges. To the extent that the taxpayer is able to defer completion of the
transaction-often retaining the right to designate the property to be received at some future point the
transaction begins to resemble less of a like-kind exchange and more a sale of one property followed, at
some future point, by a purchase of a second property or properties. This is particularly true when (as
was the case in Starker v. United States) the taxpayer might have received like-kind or non-like-kind
property in the future. Congress believed that like-kind exchange treatment is inappropriate in such
situations and that the general rule requiring recognition of gain on sales or exchanges of property should
apply to these cases.
The special treatment of like-kind exchanges has also been justified from an administrative
standpoint because of the difficulty of valuing property which is exchanged solely or primarily for
similar property. This rationale also is less applicable to deferred like-kind exchanges, in particular
exchanges which are 'left open' until the taxpayer has selected a suitable exchange property. In such
cases, the transferred property must be valued at a specific or near-specific dollar amount in order to
determine the aggregate value of the properties that the taxpayer may receive in the future. Thus, the
taxpayer's gain may be measured with reasonable accuracy in the year of the original transfer. Id.
123. 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A).
124. Id § 1031(a)(3)(B)(i).
125. The implementing regulations for deferred exchanges establish certain safe harbors where a
"qualified intermediary" is used to hold money or other property before the taxpayer receives the likekind replacement property. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(k)-1 (2020) ("Treatment of deferred exchanges.").
As a result, a cottage industry of "exchange accommodators" has developed that regularly helps facilitate
modem deferred 1031 transactions. See infra note 146.
126.
§ 1031(d).
127. Id § 1031(f).
128. Id § 1031(h).
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investment property in 2000 for $4 million. By 2020, the land has appreciated in

value to $10 million. Under baseline tax principles, the taxpayer would have a
basis in the property of $4 million and $6 million of unrealized gain. Suppose
Taxpayer A wants to transfer Property 1 for another investment property

(Property 2), an office building valued at $10 million. Taxpayer A would be
forced to recognize the $6 million in gain upon the transfer of Property 1 for
Property 2 and pay federal income tax of more than $1.4 million.1 29 However,
taking advantage of § 1031, Taxpayer A could defer payment of the taxes and
instead carry the $4 million basis over to Property 2. The provision thus clearly
offers a significant time value of money advantage to Taxpayer A-rather than
immediately paying $1.4 million to the federal government, the value of that
money, as captured within the $10 million valuation of Property 2, is allowed to
continue to appreciate to the benefit of Taxpayer A.
Section 1031 rules place no limit on the number of times capital gains can
be deferred using 1031 exchanges. 3 0 A developer can invest in Property A, five

years later roll those gains over into Property B, and so on to Property Z fifty
years later. One might think that eventually the gain would be recognized when
Property Z is cashed out. That would be correct but for a separate provision in
the tax code: the step-up in basis afforded to taxpayers at death. 11 This separate
provision reduces the taxes owed by parties that inherit such property by
"stepping up" their basis to fair market value, thus eliminating any taxable gain.
Thus, the actual strategy made available by our modern tax code is to avoid
paying federal capital gains taxes altogether.
B.

Comparison of OpportunityZones and Section 1031

On their face, the Opportunity Zone program and the § 1031 like-kind
exchange provision appear very different. The former is held out to be a placebased economic development tool intended to help those living in economically
distressed communities, whereas the latter makes no such claim. Yet placing the
two side by side reveals how, in reality, these two provisions sitting not far from
each other in the U.S. tax code share a number of similarities.
Both provisions allow real estate investors to defer payment of taxation due
on gain upon the sale of real property. 132 Both require that proceeds from a sale
be reinvested within 180 days. Both provisions can be used not only to defer
taxation but, in certain circumstances, to avoid paying taxes on the gain

altogether. And, as discussed below, certain real estate industry advocacy groups
support

129.
130.
131.
132.

§

1031 on grounds that, not unlike the Opportunity Zone program, it will

For assumptions regarding the capital gains rate and net investment tax, see supra note 35.
See generally26 U.S.C. § 1031.
See id. § 1014(a)(1).
Note that in both cases the gains can come from commercial or residential real estate.
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have positive spillover effects with respect to bolstering employment and other
local economic factors.1 33
Below these broad thematic similarities lie differences between
Opportunity Zones and § 1031 that are more technical in nature. The
Opportunity Zone program is narrower and broader than § 1031 in certain

respects. It is narrower in that the investment of course must be made in a census
tract designated as a Qualified Opportunity Zone, whereas under

§

1031 there is

no general geographic limitation within the United States. The Opportunity Zone
program is broader in that capital gains need not have come from real estate, but
rather may have been generated from any number of assets-e.g., stocks, bonds,
artwork or other collectibles, etc.-so long as the gains are treated as capital.
And those gains need not be rolled into real estate, but can be reinvested in a
variety of other qualified property or businesses located in QOZs, even though
real estate has thus far come to dominate the field. For § 1031, it must be a real
estate-to-real estate exchange.
How would a taxpayer decide whether to roll gains over using the
Opportunity Zone program versus a

§ 1031 exchange? The Opportunity Zone

program might be favored if the taxpayer (1) has capital gains that are not from
real estate, (2) has not identified a § 1031 exchange piece of real estate within
the required forty-five-day period, (3) affirmatively wants to make an investment
in an asset other than real estate, (4) prefers to receive the near-term (five-year
or seven-year) step-up in basis rather than waiting until death for a complete
step-up in basis, (5) prefers the structure of investing in a Qualified Opportunity

Fund rather than directly in real estate, or (6) sees an investment opportunity with
significant upside in an Opportunity Zone and wants to take advantage of the

exclusion of all future appreciation.
By contrast, a taxpayer with a piece of appreciated real estate might favor
a

§ 1031 exchange over an Opportunity Zone investment if the taxpayer (1) does

not want to be bound by the geographic limitation of investing in a census tract
designated as an Opportunity Zone, (2) does not want to be forced to realize at
least 85 percent of the deferred gain by no later than the end of 2026, and/or (3)
does not want to invest in a new construction or significant rehabilitation project
of the sort typically selected in order to meet the "original use" or "substantial
improvement"
program. 134

requirements

for buildings

under the

Opportunity

Zone

These mechanical differences are described to demonstrate how a typical
taxpayer likely would analyze these two options-as alternative approaches to
tax avoidance with various pros and cons. Noticeably absent from the analysis:
what sort of investment might produce the most local jobs? What sort of
investments will benefit local, community-based organizations or disadvantaged

133.
134.

See infra Part II.C for discussion of the "economic rationale" for § 1031.
See supra note 51.
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business enterprises? What sort of community assets are most neededaffordable housing, a grocery store, a recreation facility? The Opportunity Zone
program and the § 1031 exclusion share a fundamental nature: first and
foremost, they are simply tax shelters.
C.

Policy Rationales & Critiques

What are the policy rationales for allowing taxpayers to defer recognition
of gains for § 1031 like-kind exchanges? Unlike the Opportunity Zone program,
economic development in low-income communities is not typically an explicit
rationale. Yet at least four others have been advanced, which I shall refer to as:
(1) the measurement rationale, (2) the administrability rationale, (3) the liquidity
rationale, and (4) the economic rationale. I will address each in turn.
One possible justification for § 1031 is the difficulty of accurately
measuring the amount of gain when an investment has not been "cashed out,"
but rather merely exchanged for similar property. 35 If no specific dollar amount
has been received for a piece of exchanged property, how would the taxpayer or
the IRS know how much tax is due? Yet as far back as the original 1921 likekind exchange provision, Congress allowed taxpayers to take advantage of the
tax deferral regardless of whether the property had a "readily realizable market
value."1 3 6 If the measurement rationale were the lone operative justification, at a
minimum § 1031 would be overbroad since the provision covers like-kind
transactions in which valuation is clear.' 3 7 In the context of a modern real estate
transaction, this would be the great majority of cases given, for example, the
135. A corollary to this rationale is a related fairness argument that it is not fair to tax mere
"pencil on paper" gains, the true magnitude of which is not certain. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959) (discussing the Congressional intent of § 1031,
noting that "Congress was primarily concerned with inequity, in the case of an exchange, of forcing a
taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort").
Often such arguments reduce to claims related to measurement and illiquidity.
136. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c), 42. Stat. 227, 230 ("For the purposes
of this title, on an exchange of property, real, personal or mixed, for any other such property, no gain or
loss shall be recognized unless the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value;
but even if the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value, no gain or loss shall
be recognized (1) When any such property held for investment, or for productive use in trade orbusiness
(not including stock-in-trade or other property held primarily for sale), is exchanged for property of a
like kind or use .... ").
137. The 2017 revenue proposals under the Obama administration, which sought to curtail
§ 1031, made a similar point: "Historically, section 1031 deferral has been justified on the basis that
valuing exchanged property is difficult. However, for the exchange of one property for another of equal
value to occur, taxpayers must be able to value the properties. In addition, many, if not most, exchanges
affected by this proposal are facilitated by qualified intermediaries who help satisfy the exchange
requirement by selling the exchanged property and acquiring the replacement property. These complex
three-party exchanges were not contemplated when the provision was enacted. They highlight the fact
that valuation of exchanged property is not the hurdle it was when the provision was originally enacted."
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2017
REVENUE PROPOSALS 107 (2016) [hereinafter 2017 REVENUE PROPOSAL GENERAL EXPLANATIONS],

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf

[https://perma.cc/C3L2-QVZV].
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availability of appraisals. Non-simultaneous exchanges typically involve two
purchase and sale agreements, listing a price for the sold and acquired property,
respectively. Furthermore, § 1031 itself necessitates the valuation of the
exchanged property in many transactions; exchanges that involve the transfer of
cash in addition to like-kind property, for example, require valuing properties
since some partial gain may be recognized up to the amount of cash received. 38
Thus, the valuation rationale fails to explain the full reach of § 1031.
A House Report several years after passage of the original nonrecognition

provision for like-kind exchanges indicates that a related concern of
administrability was among the key justifications for the provision:
The Treasury Department states that its experience indicates that this
provision does not in fact result in tax avoidance. If all exchanges were
made taxable, it would be necessary to evaluate the property received in
exchange in thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions
each year, and for the time being, at least, claims for theoretical losses
would probably exceed any profits which could be established. The
committee does not believe that the net revenue which could thereby be
collected, particularly in these years, would justify the additional
administrative expense. Consequently, the exchange provisions have
not been changed.13 9
Given that the modern provision is limited to exchanges of real property, this
concern about "thousands of horse trades" would seem less relevant. This
argument was developed in the context of informal barter transactions of
personal property; taxing each exchange could have added significant
complexity to filing a tax return. As discussed above, exchanges of real property
are typically formal transactions, subject to the statute of frauds, in which a
variety of valuations are made. They involve recording and other formalities that
build a certain amount of administrative burden into the basic fabric of the
transaction. Requiring the recognition of gains in the context of real estate
exchanges certainly poses no more administrative burden than in the context of
personal property exchanges-such as the horse trades mentioned in the passage
above-the gains from which now must be recognized immediately per the 2017
amendment to § 1031 limiting its scope to real property. Much of the force of
the administrability rationale disappeared when Congress limited the scope of

§

1031 to real property."

138. See Starkerv. U.S., 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) ("But this valuation rationale also
has its limits. So long as a single dollar in cash or other non-like-kind property ('boot') is received by
the taxpayer along with like-kind property, valuation of both properties in the exchange becomes
necessary.").
139. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13 (1934), as reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 564.
140.
See FED'N OF EXCH. ACCOMMODATORS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TAX POLICIES
SUPPORTING
IRC
SECTION
1031
2
[hereinafter
FEA
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY],

https://www.1031taxreform.com/wp-content/uploads/FEA-Legislative-History-of-1031-Final-9-119.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDA3-BQVF] (arguing that the administrative convenience rationale has been
"irrelevant since [§ 103 's] inception").
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The Starker court considered a third alternative rationale: liquidity.
"Congress appeared to be concerned that taxpayers would not have the cash to
pay a tax on the capital gain if the exchange triggered recognition."141 After all,
if a taxpayer simultaneously exchanges one property for another of equal value,
then the taxpayer may lack alternative funds with which to pay any tax liability.
Yet exchanges of non-like-kind property regularly pose the same problem, as do
exchanges of non-real estate like-kind property. More importantly, given the
modern use of § 1031 in the context of non-simultaneous exchanges, it is
somewhat of a misnomer to say that the taxpayer lacks liquidity. The original
property in fact has been sold for cash, and that cash is simply being held for
reinvestment in a different piece of real estate of similar value. The cash is
available; payment of taxes would simply prevent the taxpayer from acquiring

as valuable a replacement property if the IRS collected. While there may be
certain economic

reasons to defer recognition, in most modern

§ 1031

transactions, liquidity is not one of them. As such, the Starker court concluded,
"[T]he 'underlying purpose' of section 1031 is not entirely clear."1 42
Yet there is a fourth, more formidable rationale-the economic rationalethat cannot be so readily set aside. It dates back to passage of the earliest likekind exchange provision. The Congressional Record contains a reference from
Oregon Representative Willis C. Hawley regarding the original 1921 law,
supporting it on the basis that it would "promote[] such exchanges of
property."1 43 This notion of promoting exchanges of like-kind property is at the
heart of modern efforts to defend § 1031. The basic argument is that deferring
payment of taxes on like-kind exchanges will encourage transactions, a
contention that seems relatively incontrovertible. This incentive helps to avoid a
"lock-in" effect whereby taxpayers leave capital tied up in current investments
to avoid incurring tax liability, rather than transfer them to alternative more
attractive investments.

144 The argument is that § 1031 mitigates this distortive

effect of taxation and thus improves economic efficiency.

141. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1352.
142. Id.
143. 67 Cong. Rec. 5201 (Aug. 18, 1921) ("[P]rovision is made for the exchange of property,
where no gain or loss is recognized. Under the present law this has caused the Treasury a very great deal
of difficulty. Two men exchange a farm, one practically as valuable as the other. Men have exchanged
stocks and bonds in order to consolidate theirholdings of a particularkind or kinds of securities in which
there was no gain or loss recognized. The amendment liberalizes the law in the interest of the taxpayer
and provides explicit rules for determining whether any gain or loss has resulted. It also relieves such
transactions from delay, simplifies the tax return,and promotes such exchanges ofproperty.") (emphasis
added).
144. See POPKIN supra note 114, at 53 ("The economic impact is often referred to as the 'lockin' effect. A taxpayer might not dispose of an asset because realized gain is taxed (that is, the taxpayer
is 'locked-in'), even though the amount equal to the asset's value could be more efficiently invested
elsewhere or the taxpayer might prefer to use that value for personal consumption. The economic
implications seem more serious when the taxpayer foregoes an alternative investment."); FEA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 140.
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Various attempts have been made in recent years to reform or eliminate
In each instance, certain real estate industry advocacy groups have
responded by deploying the economic rationale. The Federation of Exchange
Accommodators (FEA), which bills itself as "The Voice of the 1031
Industry,"1 46 has been a particularly vociferous defender, both in advancing the

§ 1031.145

basic economic rationale and in drawing out its implications.147 These groups

contend not only that the elimination of § 1031 would reduce the number of real
estate transactions, but it would also have a number of spillover effects: reduced
real estate values, loss of employment in real estate and related industries, loss
of certain tax revenue, and, ultimately, an overall smaller economy.1 48 A report
by Ernst & Young contended that elimination of

§

1031 for residential and non-

residential real estate would lead to a total reduction in annual GDP of $9.3
billion. 149
The economic rationale is vaguely reminiscent of Porter's argument about
how to redress poverty: allow business to do business. Here, however, the § 1031
program is not specifically a poverty alleviation program-the economic

145. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of reform efforts.
146.
The
FFA
Association,
FED'N
EXCH.
ACCOMMODATORS,
https://www.1031.org/FEA/About_Us/AboutFEA/FEA/About.aspxhkey=c4436b9c-a930-4e9593c4-58dabb07486c [https://perma.cc/9KDW-9JX2] ("The Federation of Exchange Accommodators
(FEA) is the only national trade association organized to represent professionals who conduct like-kind
exchanges under Internal Revenue Code § 1031. Members include Qualified Intermediaries (QIs), their
primary tax and legal counsel, and affiliated industries (TIC sponsors, banks, real estate brokers, title
companies, settlement/escrow agents, etc.).").
147. See Letter from Federation of Exchange Accommodators to Center for American Progress
3 (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.1031taxreform.com/wp-content/uploads/FEA-Response-to-CAP("Section
Growing-Consensus-to-Improve-Tax-Code-10-7-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XQS-UNG5]
1031 exchanges contribute to the velocity of the economy by stimulating a broad spectrum of
transactions which, in turn, generate jobs and taxable income through business profits, wages,
commissions, insurance premiums, financial services, and discretionary spending by gainfully
employed workers. This transactional activity raises state, local and federal tax revenue through transfer,
sales and use taxes and increased property taxes. The loss of this economic stimulus would be costly to
the U.S. economy, creating a chilling effect on real estate transactions, reduced demand for
manufactured goods, and job loss as many transactions will be abandoned or delayed by taxpayers
unwilling or unable to withstand an effective tax on their working cash flow."); see also FED'N ExCH.
ACCOMMODATORS, RECENT THREATS TO IRC § 1031 LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES (on file with author)
[hereinafter FEA RECENT THREATS TO § 1031] ("Like-kind exchanges benefit millions of American
investors and businesses every year. Section 1031 encourages businesses to expand and keep dollars
moving in the U.S. economy. Industry studies report that without the § 1031 tax-deferral benefit, small
and medium sized businesses would not be able to reinvest in their business, real estate values would
decline, the U.S. economy would suffer, and enterprises of all sizes would forgo opportunities to increase
capital investment and grow their businesses.").
148. See FEA RECENT THREATS TO § 1031, supra note 147.
149.
ERNST & YOUNG, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REPEALING LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE RULES, at iv
(2015),
https://www.1031taxreform.com/wp-content/uploads/EY-Report-for-LKE-Coalition-onmacroeconomic-impact-of-repealing-LKE-rules-revised-2015-11-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZG48QM2]. Query whether this is a compelling argument for a tax expenditure estimated to cost
approximately $14 billion annually. See 2015 JCT TAx EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, supra note 113, at
28.
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§ 1031 exchanges for real property located anywhere

because such exchanges are good for productivity.
The premise that § 1031 has positive spillover effects on the broader
economy in the manner that the FEA suggests is simply false with respect to a
wide variety of covered transactions. An investor who trades one piece of
appreciated raw land for another and lets the latter remain undeveloped enjoys
the same tax deferral as one who puts exchanged land to productive use. This is
not to argue that § 1031 does not result in economic gains to trade among the
exchanging parties, but such gains are regularly taxed in other contexts. Nor is it

to argue that § 1031 exchanges never promote activity that is beneficial to
individuals beyond the exchanging parties.1 50 But if the justification is to
promote transactions that enhance economic activity in a manner that generates
positive externalities for others, the provision is not especially narrowly tailored.
Furthermore, the tax code already provides a large tax benefit to encourage
real estate investment-the capitalgains rate itself When employee Taxpayer J

earns a marginal dollar of income, the top marginal tax rate is significantly higher
than when real estate investor Taxpayer K gains a marginal dollar from the sale
of an investment in real estate.151 The fact that built into the structure of the tax
code itself is a preferential rate for capital gains already does to some degree
what the economic rationale promotes. 5 2 The question then would seemingly
not be should the tax code provide preferential treatment for real estate-related
capital gains, but rather should the tax code provide a second layer of preferential
treatment in the form of

§ 1031 exchanges.

Most broadly, the economic argument, if taken to its logical conclusion,
proves too much. It would support not only

§ 1031 exchanges, but any tax

preference that promotes business activity.1 53 Of course allowing a real estate
developer to defer payment of capital gains tax leaves more money available to
reinvest in new real estate projects. So would eliminating all tax on non-likekind exchanges or, for that matter, all capital gains taxes entirely. However, in a
nation that has decided to adopt a tax structure to raise funds for other public

150. Consider two real estate developers with skills more specialized to develop the land held by
the other. Section 1031 clearly provides an incentive to generate the beneficial economic activity that
would result from an exchange.
151. For taxable year 2021, the top marginal rate for individual ordinary income is 37 percent.
See 26 U.S.C. § 1. The comparable rate for long-term capital gains is 20 percent. Id. Adding the 3.8
percent net investment tax paid by many individuals with a modified adjusted gross income of greater
than $200,000 yields a total rate of 23.8 percent. See 26 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
152. This is not to make any specific claims regarding the precise level of investment induced by
the capital gains rate alone but merely to suggest that the tax code already contains significant incentives
that serve the ends of the economic rationale.
153. Of course, some would support a massive overhaul of our current tax structure. See, e.g.,
Mitchell L. Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (2005) (discussing the longstanding debate over whether certain versions of a consumption tax could produce a more efficient and
equitable tax structure). Consideration of broader proposals to overhaul the basic U.S. income tax system
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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priorities, a particular deviation from that structure should argue more than just
that refraining from collecting taxes would leave more money in the taxpayer's
hands for investment.

Those who would defend § 1031 might argue that, unlike the Opportunity
Zone program that allows for certain partial exclusions of tax liability entirely,1 4
the § 1031 exchange program merely defers recognition of gain, and that tax
must be paid eventually when the real estate is sold in a non-like-kind
transaction. However, that argument obfuscates how, as described above,
modern real estate developers can use successive § 1031 transactions until the
step-up in basis at death to avoid paying tax altogether.'

The step-up in basis

provision is based at least in part on an avoidance of double taxation rationale:
that the government will obtain its due via the estate tax. But particularly given
recent adjustments, the estate tax does not serve as a failsafe because of the large
exemption from taxation that covers many estates.1 56
In sum,

§ 1031 allows real estate investors to defer, and in many cases

entirely avoid, paying tax on the income produced by their investment. The
provision promotes real estate transactions that may in some cases have positive

spillover effects. But the United States has adopted a tax code that taxes
income-including investment income-to meet other pressing public policy
needs. The economic rationale for applying preferential treatment to real estaterelated capital gains, beyond the advantage already afforded by the capital gains
rate itself, is ultimately unsatisfying.
III.
UNIVERSAL HOUSING VOUCHERS

A.

Housing Affordability Challenges

What are those other pressing public policy needs that could be funded were
the IRS to collect the foregone tax revenue of the Opportunity Zone program and
§ 1031? Housing assistance for the most vulnerable families in the nation is a
candidate worthy of consideration. A "decent home and suitable living

154. See supra notes 30, 31, and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. A May 2020 letter from the Federation of
Exchange Accommodators, a lobbying group that supports § 1031, to President Biden suggested that
successive 1031 exchange transactions occur relatively infrequently. See Letter from Federation of
Exchange Accommodators to The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.1031.org/FEAPdfs/Advocacy/FEA-ltr_to_BidenCampaign-5%275 %2720.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4T73-HVZN] (referencing data suggesting "that an overwhelming majority (88%) of
replacement properties acquired in a Section 1031 exchange were ultimately disposed through a taxable
sale, rather than through a subsequent exchange or other non-recognition transfer.").
156. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ESTATE TAx, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/estate-tax (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JY78-P28E] (noting
an individual exemption for estates up to $11,580,000 in 2020, and explaining that spouses may pass
any unused amount of the exemption on to a surviving spouse, effectively bringing the exemption for
married couples to more than $23 million).
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environment for every American family" has been stated as the national housing
objective in the United States for decades.1 57 Yet we continue to fall well short

of this goal.
The COVID-19 global pandemic has significantly raised the profile of this
issue, as the housing implications of the public health crisis have regularly graced
the pages of major news outlets.1 58 As the U.S. unemployment rate skyrocketed
to levels unseen since the Great Depression,1 59 attention quickly focused on what
would happen to those unable to keep up with mortgage or rent payments. A

report prepared for the National Council of State Housing Agencies put the
estimated back rent owed by January 2021 at $34 billion.1 60

Yet, like many crises do, the current pandemic has only brought into
mainstream consciousness phenomena that existed well before this virus landed
in the United States. Nearly 50 percent of all renter households were already
cost-burdened, paying more than the federally defined "affordable" 30 percent
of income on housing.161 Moreover, 10.8 million renter households and 7.4
million homeowners were severely cost-burdened, paying more than 50 percent
of income on housing costs. 162 These households were already regularly forced

157. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
158. See, e.g., Annie Nova, Looming Evictions May Soon Make 28 Million Homeless in US.,
Expert Says, CNBC (July 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/10/looming-evictions-may-soonmake-28-million-homeless-expert-says.html [https://penna.cc/6MQE-TZL7] (quoting Emily Benfer)
("We have never seen this extent of eviction in such a truncated amount of time in our history. We can
expect this to increase dramatically in the coming weeks and months, especially as the limited support
and intervention measures that are in place start to expire. About 10 million people, over a period of
years, were displaced from their homes following the foreclosure crisis in 2008. We're looking at 20
million to 28 million people in this moment, between now and September, facing eviction."); Dartunorro
Clark, Eviction Crisis':HousingAdvocates Fear Waves ofHomelessness asMoratoriumsExpire, NBC
NEWS (July 4, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/eviction-crisis-housingadvocates-fear-waves-homelessness-moratoriums-expire-n1232846
[https://perma.cc/LJ82-532C]
(discussing the "crippling economic effects" of the pandemic that could "force a wave of evictions"
across the United States); Caitlin Dickerson, Sleeping Outside in a Pandemic: Vulnerable Renters Face
Evictions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/us/coronavirusevictions-renters-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/KT56-2QRW] (discussing the expiration of
eviction moratoria and the likely widespread impact, particularly on immigrant households).
159. See Heather Long & Andrew Van Dam, US. Unemployment Rate Soars to 14.7 Percent,
the
Worst
Since
the
Depression
Era,
WASH.
POST
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/08/april-2020-jobs-report/
[https://perma.cc/TXQ7-CDNN].
160.

See STOUT, ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND EXPECTED RENTAL SHORTFALL AND POTENTIAL

EVICTION FILINGS IN THE U.S. 5 (2020), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/Analysis-ofCurrent-and-Expected-Rental-Shortfall-and-Potential-Evictions-in-the-USStout_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K2A-45DSc].
161.

See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S

HOUSING 2019, at 4 (2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard
[https://perma.cc/MGG7-8ZX9]
_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019%20%281%29.pdf
(noting that 47.4 percent of all U.S. renter households are cost-burdened).
162.
Id
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to make difficult tradeoffs between necessities like housing, food, transportation,
and healthcare.1 63
Housing challenges are of course more severe for those with the lowest
incomes. There are approximately eleven million "extremely low-income U.S.
households," defined as earning no more than 30 percent of the local area median
income.1 64 Roughly 85 percent of such households are cost-burdened and 70

percent are severely cost-burdened.1 65 There are only thirty-seven units of
affordable and available housing for every one hundred extremely low-income
renter households. 166 This number increases to fifty-eight affordable and
available units for every one hundred "very low-income households" earning no
more than 50 percent of the local area median income. 67
These housing challenges disproportionately affect households of color.
Black renters suffer the highest levels of housing cost burdens, whether renting
or owning a home.1 68 In 2019, nationally

567,715

people experienced

homelessness 169-40 percent of them Black, even though Black residents made
up only 13 percent of the U.S. population. 170
The unprecedented scale of the housing crisis looming in the wake of
COVID-19 will require dramatic federal action. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act, 171 coupled with a patchwork of state and local

163. See id at 32 ("Compared with households with housing they could afford, moderately costburdened households in the lowest expenditure quartile spent 13 percent less on food, 40 percent less on
healthcare, and 23 percent less on transportation in 2017. The differences are even starker for severely
burdened households, who spent 37 percent less on food, 77 percent less on healthcare, and 60 percent
less on transportation.").
164. Id at33.
165.
See ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, IKRA RAFI, DAN THREET & DIANE YENTEL,
NAT'L Low INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH: THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING 8 (2021),

https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/2021/Out-of-Reach_ 2 0 2 1 .pdf [https://penna.cc/GW79-XQE2].
166. See 2019 JCHS REPORT, supra note 161, at 33.
167. Id.
168. See id at 32 ("The cost-burdened share is highest among [B]lack renters at 54.9 percent,
followed closely by [Latinx/Hispanic renters] at 53.5 percent. The rates for Asians and other minorities
are noticeably lower at 45.7 percent, but still above the [W]hite share of 42.6 percent."). While the term
"Hispanic" refers to all "persons of Spanish-speaking origin or ancestry," the term "Latinx" refers to
"anyone of Latin American origin or ancestry." NAT'L ASS'N OF HISPANIC JOURNALISTS, CULTURAL
COMPETENCE HANDBOOK 7 (2021), https://nahj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NAHJ-CulturalCompliance-Handbook-Revised-12-20-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3MT-KTFT]. Though the report uses
the term "Hispanic," the author and editors have substituted the term "Latinx/Hispanic" here in
recognition that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it appears the report oversimplified the
census data upon which it is based. "Latinx/Hispanic" is used here to avoid the Eurocentric reliance on
the term "Hispanic" and to more accurately represent the underlying data.
169.

NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, STATE OF HOMELESSNESS: 2020 Edition,

https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness2020/ [https://perma.cc/9TX5-BBK8].
170. AURAND et al., supra note 165, at 1.
171. Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 4022-24, 134 Stat. 281, 490-94 (2020) (providing for a 120-day
eviction moratorium for tenants in certain federally backed housing and a thirty-day notice period prior
to eviction upon expiration of the moratorium).
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eviction moratoria,1 72 and the subsequent Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) national eviction moratorium,1 73 provided some initial relief
to stave off the worst of the fallout. By March 2021, Congress had allocated
$46.5 billion in emergency rental aid.17 4

While much needed, these stopgap measures do not address the underlying
and persistent housing affordability challenges that existed long before the
pandemic arrived. These challenges arise from enduring structural features of the
modern U.S. economy, including the fact that wages have not kept pace with
housing costs. Median real rents went up by 13 percent between 2001 and 2018

while median real incomes declined. 7 5 The average minimum wage worker with
children would be forced to work nearly ninety-seven hours per week to afford
a modest two-bedroom apartment. 7 6 Work simply does not pay for a large swath
of U.S. households.177 Solving this problem will require more than sporadic
interventions at times of visible and dramatic rupture. Rather, it will require
making long-term changes to priorities regarding scarce federal resources.

172. For a comprehensive analysis of state and local eviction moratoria, see Michelle D. Layser,
Edward W. De Barbieri, Andrew J. Greenlee, Tracy A. Kaye & Blaine G. Saito, MitigatingHousing
InstabilityDuring a Pandemic, 99 OR. L. REV. 445 (2021).
173. See Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19,
85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020) (temporarily preventing evictions, but not providing for any rent
relief). On his first day in office, President Biden extended the CDC eviction moratorium through the
end of March 2021. See Lisa Rowan, CDC Extends Renters' Eviction Moratorium Through March. Is
More Rent Relief Next?, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.foibes.com/advisor/personalfinance/eviction-moratorium-extended-to-end-of-march/ [https://penna.cc/BY3N-CXSA]. Note that
the Biden administration would go on to extend the moratorium multiple times. See, e.g., Glenn Thrush,
The Biden Administration Plans to Extend the FederalMoratorium on Evictions for Another Month,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/us/politics/cdc-evictionmoratorium-extended.html [https://penna.cc/JZJ9-9SYU].
174.
Jason DeParle, Biden AdministrationMoves to Speed Aid to Renters, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/us/politics/renters-aid-bidenpandemic.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/P7NA-PDPC] (discussing the $25
billion allocation in December 2020 and the $21.5 billion allocation in March 2021).
175.

See CTR.

ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,

FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEETS

2
(2021),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-19hous-factsheet-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V7V-UKZL].
176. AURAND et al., supra note 165, at 2.
177. The proposal discussed in this Article to expand housing voucher coverage to all extremely
low-income households shares certain features with another intervention that has gained traction in
recent policy conversations namely, a variety of proposals related to providing a universal basic
income (UBI). See Benjamin M. Leff, EITCfor All: A UniversalBasic Income Compromise Proposal,
26 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019) (comparing UBI with the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and offering four proposals to make the EITC more like UBI). For consideration of the muchdebated relative merits of cash versus in-kind transfers, which is beyond the scope of this Article, see
Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The LibertarianCase for a Basic Income, 2017
WIS. L. REv. 1189 (2017). In this Article, I express no opinion on the relative tradeoffs of housing
assistance versus income support.
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A UniversalHousing Voucherfor Extremely Low-Income Renters

Funding a Universal Voucher

One approach to addressing the most severe housing challenges would be
to dramatically expand the program that currently provides the most rental
assistance to households in need: the "Section 8" Housing Choice Voucher
program. Under the voucher program, income-qualifying households find a
rental housing unit on the private market and enter into a lease with the landlord.
The tenant pays roughly 30 percent of income as rent and, assuming the housing
meets certain physical quality standards and costs no more than certain HUDestablished rent levels, the federal government, in partnership with local housing
authorities, pays the balance.
In 2019, the Housing Choice Voucher program made 2,556,270 units of

housing affordable and available, ensuring that 5,248,994 low-income people
had a roof over their head.7 8 Notably, per HUD data, 50 percent of these voucher
holders have a Black head of household. 7 9 Recent scholarship has found that
housing vouchers utilized in "high-opportunity" neighborhoods can have
significant positive economic impacts. In one study, children moving to lower-

poverty areas at age thirteen or younger resulted in future annual income of 31
percent higher than a control group. 10 By one estimate, moving to a highopportunity neighborhood can result in an approximately $210,000 increase in

lifetime income.

181 Research has also found that utilizing housing vouchers in

high-opportunity areas can significantly improve safety, subjective sense of

178.

PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 18.

179. Id The other race or ethnicity categories tracked by HUD with respect to voucherutilization
include White (non-Latinx/Hispanic) at 30 percent, Latinx/Hispanic at 18 percent (including 2 percent
Black and Latinx/Hispanic), Asian or Pacific Islander (non-Latinx/Hispanic) at 3 percent, and Native
American (non-Latinx/Hispanic) at 1 percent. Id While the HUD report used the term "Hispanic," the
author and editors have substituted the term "Latinx/Hispanic" here in recognition that including
"Latinx" as a category would have likely yielded more accurate data. See supra note 168 (explaining
the difference between the two terms).
180. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM.
ECON. REv. 855, 873 (2016) (reviewing data from HUD's Moving to Opportunity experiment from the
mid-1990s in which randomly selected families were offered the opportunity to move from high-poverty
housing projects to lower-poverty neighborhoods). Chetty, a leading economist in this research, created
the Opportunity Atlas, a mapping tool connecting location with various metrics of opportunity; Chetty
also directs the Opportunity Insights project at Harvard. See THE OPPORTUNITY ATLAS,
https://www.opportunityatlas.org
[https://penna.cc/9DC8-C5TU];
OPPORTUNITY
INSIGHTS,
https://opportunityinsights.org/ [https://perma.cc/68L9-ALZH].
181.

See Dylan Matthews, America Has a Housing Segregation Problem. Seattle May JustHave

the Solution, Vox (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/8/4/20726427/raj-chettysegregation-moving-opportunity-seattle-experiment [https://perma.cc/W95V-WS5H] (interviewing
Harvard economist Nathaniel Hendren who estimates an 8.1 percent lifetime earnings increase for a
newbom child to move from a low-opportunity to a high-opportunity neighborhood).
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well-being, and health. 8 2 Voluntarily choosing to move to a high-opportunity
neighborhood with a voucher thus carries the promise of a variety of economic
and other household benefits. This is to say nothing of the advantages, including
economic, that vouchers are likely to provide simply by making households less
housing insecure, whether or not they are utilized in a high-opportunity
neighborhood.
Despite the magnitude and potential of the Housing Choice Voucher
program, participation is not an entitlement; not all income-eligible households
receive a voucher. Given perennial funding shortfalls, roughly only one in four
eligible households receives a voucher.' 83 The remaining three-quarters of

eligible households languish, often for many years, on housing authority
waitlists. In October 2017, Los Angeles, which had closed its Section 8 waitlist
for being oversubscribed, reopened the list for the first time in thirteen years.1 84
The Housing Choice Voucher program is far from perfect. Tenants
encounter increased difficulty using vouchers in neighborhoods with low
vacancy rates. 185 Despite progress, in most jurisdictions landlords can still refuse
to lease to voucher tenants. 186 Other challenges of the program include barriers
to inter-jurisdictional collaboration and inflexible payment standards that
overpay in some areas and underpay in others, resulting in a poor use of resources
and further limiting tenant mobility. 187

Some efforts are underway to address these challenges. For example, HUD
has experimented in recent years with "Small Area Fair Market Rents," setting

182. See, e.g., Jens Ludwig, Jeffrey B. Liebman, Jeffrey R. Kling, Greg J. Duncan, Lawrence F.
Katz, Ronald C. Kessler & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, What Can We Learn About NeighborhoodEffects from
the Moving to OpportunityExperiment?, 114 AM. J. SOCIO. 144 (2008) (noting significant mental health
improvements from HUD's Moving to Opportunity Experiment); see also Chetty et al., supra note 180,
at 856 (referencing prior studies of Moving to Opportunity data).
183.
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 2014, at 30 (2014), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media/imp/sonhrl4-colorfull_O.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F8X-8XRV].
184.
See Aaron Schrank, It's a Long Waitfor Section 8 Housing in US. Cities, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/01/03/its-long-wait-section-8-housing-us-cities/
[https://perma.cc/F3G9-EFV4].
185.
See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, HOUSING VOUCHER SUCCESS AND
UTILIZATION
INDICATORS,
AND
UNDERSTANDING
UTILIZATION
DATA
2-3
(2019),

https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-4-19hous-appendix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MvIU2M-48FU].
186.
See ALISON BELL, BARBARA SARD & BECKY KOEPNICK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES, PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RENTERS USING HOUSING VOUCHERS
IMPROVES RESULTS: LESSONS FROM CITIES AND STATES THAT HAVE ENACTED SOURCE OF INCOME

LAWS
1
(2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-10-18hous.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XBB-E2PV] (noting that only one in three voucher households is covered by a source
of income protection law).
187. See, e.g., TEGELER, supranote 17, at 6, 14-16.
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program rent limits at the neighborhood ratherthan the metropolitan level. 88 An
increasing number of jurisdictions are passing source of income protection laws
that make it illegal to discriminate on the basis of Section 8 status.1 89 The Yes In
My Backyard (or YIMBY) movement is galvanizing energy around reducing

regulatory barriers at the state and local levels to new housing supply that could
help ease vacancy rates in the future.1 90 Commentators have developed a host of
other ideas that would improve the Housing Choice Voucher program, including
recent increased interest in supporting households in accessing high-opportunity
neighborhoods. 191

These advances, however, will take time, and even with them, the program
will not solve all low-income housing challenges. For example, for households
with severe physical or mental disabilities, permanent supportive housing with
on-site health and social services has proven to be an effective intervention.1 92
Such onsite care is not as easily available, or economically feasible, in a model
that relies on individual households renting dispersed units from the private
market. A toolkit approach to our housing policy is best, which includes
construction of new subsidized units, and elsewhere I have argued for how to
improve so-called "supply-side" programs, like the Low-Income Housing Tax

Credit and Public Housing programs. 193
188. Small
Area
Fair
Market
Rents,
HUD
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/public-housing/small-area-fair-market-rents/

EXCHANGE,

[https://perma.cc/ZR5P-3HJ3] (describing the final HUD rule allowing certain metropolitan areas to use
small area fair market rents calculated by zip codes rather than across entire metropolitan jurisdictions).
189.
See MOLLY M. SCOTT, MARY CUNNINGHAM, JENNIFER BIESS, JENNIFER LEE O'NEIL, PHIL
TEGELER, EBONY GAYLES & BARBARA SARD, POVERTY & RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL,
EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY

PROGRAM app. B (2013), https://prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf [https://penna.cc/5GAP-6BBH] (listing
in an updated appendix more than one hundred state and local governments with such laws as of March
2021).
190.

See, e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption amid a Housing

Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823 (2019) (describing increased state intervention in local land use regulations
in response to affordable housing shortages).
191. See TEGELER, supra note 17 (advocating for extending permitted housing search times,
security deposit assistance, and enhanced "portability" of vouchers making it easier to move from one
public housing authority jurisdiction to another, among other interventions).
192. See Maria C. Raven, Matthew J. Niedzwiecki & Margot Kushel, A Randomized Trial of
Permanent Supportive Housingfor ChronicallyHomeless Personswith High Use of Publicly Funded
Services, 55 HEALTH SERV. RSCH. 797 (2020) (finding that chronically homeless individuals who
received a unit of permanent supportive housing had reduced psychiatric emergency department visits
and increased outpatient mental health care).
193. See, e.g., Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capturein SubsidizedHousing, 10 HARv. L.
& POL'Y REV. 521 (2016) (arguing for a nonprofit developer preference in Low-Income Housing Tax
Creditallocations); BrandonM. Weiss, LocatingAffordable Housing: The Legal System'sMisallocation
of SubsidizedHousing Incentives, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 215 (2018) (arguing for a revision to state housing
credit allocation rules to ensure affordable housing project rents are below market); Brandon M. Weiss,
Narrowly-TailoredPrivatization, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEv. L. 79 (2017) (evaluating
the Rental Assistance Demonstration approach to recapitalizing the Public Housing stock). For the
purposes of this Article, I am less concerned with settling decades-long debates regarding whichprecise
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Yet proposals to significantly expand the Housing Choice Voucher
program have gained political momentum in recent years.1 94 Matthew Desmond

proposed a universal voucher for extremely low-income households in his
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American
City.1 95 Democratic candidates for President in the 2020 election, including now-

President Joe Biden, picked up on the idea of providing vouchers to all eligible
households.1 96 My aim in this Article is of relatively modest ambition-to
consider one approach to how, via shifting federal tax priorities, we might fund
such a proposal that, unlike the Opportunity Zone program, would clearly have
positive economic effects for low-income households.
What would it cost to expand the Housing Choice Voucher program to
cover all extremely low-income households as Desmond proposed? He

assortment of federal housing policy interventions is best and instead am focused on a more modest
pursuit how we could fund an idea that has gained some significant political momentum in recent
years and that would clearly help many low-income households. Forbackground on the broader supplyside versus demand-side debate, see William C. Apgar, Jr., Which Housing Policy is Best?, 1 HOus.
POL'YDEBATE 1 (1990).

194.

Of course, calls to increase housing vouchers to help households access low-poverty

neighborhoods have existed for decades. See, e.g., Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black
Ghetto, 1 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 11 (2006) (considering the impact of making fifty thousand
incremental vouchers available every year for ten years for "inner-city" families to move to "non-poor
neighborhoods").
195.

See MATrHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 308-

11(2016). "Extremely low-income households," as discussed above, are typically defined as households
earning no more than 30 percent of the local area median income. See AURAND et al., supra note 165,
at 281.
196. See The Biden Planfor Investing in our Communities Through Housing, JOEBIDEN.COM
(July 29, 2020), https://joebiden.com/housing/ [https://perma.cc/EZU3-FQ3D] ("Provide Section 8
housing vouchers to every eligible family so that no one has to pay more than 30% of their income for
rental housing. Roughly three in four households eligible for Section 8 rental assistance do not receive
housing assistance because the program is underfunded. Biden's approach is straightforward: the
Section 8 rental housing assistance program should be fully funded so that everyone eligible gets the
assistance they need to pay their rent for a safe home. Biden will devote resources to bothvoucher-based
rental assistance and the project-based program. Over time, this approach will provide assistance to at
least 17 million low-income families. And, as part of the Homeowner and Renter Bill of Rights, Biden
will enact a law prohibiting landlords from discriminating against renters receiving federal housing
benefits."). Biden's first proposed budget requested funding for an additional 200,000 vouchers. See
Glenn Thrush, Biden Proposes a Massive Expansion of Housing Programsfor the Poor, Signaling a
Big
Shift
in
Poverty
Policy,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Apr.
9,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/us/housing-biden-budget.html [https://perma.cc/E34G-SKMF].
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suggested that the price tag would be $22.5 billion. 9 7 This essentially would be
a doubling of the current funding, which in FY 2020 was $23.87 billion.1 98
Where might Congress start to look for such funds? Eliminating § 1031
exchanges altogether would be a good place to start. The tax expenditure costs
the federal government approximately $13.6 billion annually.1 99 According to a
database maintained by HUD, the average cost to the government of a voucher
is $807 per month, or roughly $10,000 ($9,684) per year .200 If $13.6 billion were

available to the federal treasury through the elimination of § 1031, those savings
could be used to fund roughly 1.4 million new vouchers per year. Assuming a
2.3:1 ratio of occupants per unit, 20 ' that would bring housing security to more

than 3.2 million additional U.S. residents on an annual basis. Add the annual
$3.4 billion estimated cost of the Opportunity Zone program 20 2 and the available
total would increase to approximately $17 billion. That is nearly all the money
necessary to fund Desmond's proposal-funds for approximately 1.8 million
new vouchers to house more than 4 million additional extremely low-income
residents.
2.

PoliticalChallenges

Any attempt to redirect the value of the § 1031 tax expenditure will no
doubt be met with fierce political opposition. As discussed above, some version
of the provision for nonrecognition of gain for like-kind exchanges dates back a
hundred years. The longevity of the provision is attributable to widespread
support from industry over the years. The Federation of Exchange
Accommodators, described above, has been a particularly staunch defender of

197. DESMOND, supra note 195, at 311 (referencing a 2013 study by the Bipartisan Policy
Center). By comparison, Trump's fiscal year 2021 budget requested $740.5 billion for national defense,
nearly thirty-three times this amount. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, A
BUDGET

FOR

AMERICA'S

FUTURE,

FISCAL

YEAR

2021

2

(2020),

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2021-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2021-BUD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4SR-7EKK]. The same budget requested $47.9 billion in total gross discretionary
spending for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id at 59.
198.

See NAT'L Low INCOME HOUS. COAL., FY21 BUDGET CHART FOR SELECTED HUD AND

USDA PROGRAMS (2020), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NLIHC_HUD-USDA_Budget-Chart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JRP2-AQFD] (showing the FY 2020 final appropriation for tenant-based rental
assistance at $23.874 billion). Another study found that to cover all eligible households, including very
low-income households in addition to extremely low-income households, the cost would be $62 billion
per year. Mary K. Cunningham, It's Time to Reinforce the Housing Safety Net by Adopting Universal
Vouchersfor Low-Income Renters, URB. WIRE (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/itstime-reinforce-housing-safety-net-adopting-universal-vouchers-low-income-renters
[https://perma.cc/VCS5-BUQM]. "Very low-income households," as described above, are typically
defined as households earning no more than 50 percent of the local area median income. See AURAND
et al., supra note 165, at 281.
199. See 2015 JCT TAx EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, supra note 113, at 28.
200. PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 18. Note that increased administrative
costs associated with expanding the program could affect the actual number.
201. See id
202. See 2019 JCT TAx EXPENDITURES ESTIMATES, supra note 5, at 26.
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the tax expenditure. The FEA notes nearly one hundred other organizations that
support

§ 1031, including the National Association of Home Builders, the

National Association of Realtors, the National Apartment Association, and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 20 3
Yet various initiatives over the past decade have attempted to eliminate or
scale back

§ 1031, with some success. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would have

eliminated the provision entirely. 204 The Obama administration's final budget
for FY 2017 would have limited the amount of capital gains that could be
deferred under § 1031 to $1 million per taxpayer per year and would have
eliminated preferential treatment of like-kind exchanges of certain sorts of
personal property-including works of art and collectibles. 205 And, as discussed
above, in a relatively dramatic change to the provision, the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 limited the provision to real property exchanges, excluding a wide
variety of other types of property that had formerly been covered.206 It would

thus seem that industry advocacy is not insurmountable.
The current political moment may be a particularly ripe one for change.
Indeed, in July 2020, then-candidate Biden proposed eliminating the use of

§

1031

by

investors

with

annual

incomes

over

$400,000.207

In

the

announcement, Biden stated that if elected he intended to "[c]los[e] loopholes.
Unproductive tax cuts for high-income real estate investors while ensuring highincome earners pay their tax bills." 208 During his speech at the Democratic
National Convention, he again stated, "And we can pay for these investments by
ending loopholes . . . . Because we don't need a tax code that rewards wealth
more than it rewards work." 20 9 In announcing his American Families Plan, Biden
reiterated his support for limiting § 1031, though the plan increased the
exemption to $500,000.210 The resurgence of the Black Lives Matter social

203.

See FEA RECENT THREATS TO § 1031, supra note 147, at 2.

204.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, A DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS TO REFORM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE II - BUSINESS TAX

REFORM, JCX-14-14, at 62-64 (2014) ("The proposal repeals the provision providing for nonrecognition
of gain in the case of like-kind exchanges.").
205.

See 2017 REVENUE PROPOSAL GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 137, at 107.

206. See supranote 117 and accompanying text.
207. See Clark et al, supra note 25.
208. See Rich Bockmann, Biden's Tax Plan Would "Pullthe Rug Out" from Under the Real
Estate Industry: Insiders, REAL DEAL (July 21, 2020), https://therealdeal.com/2020/07/21/bidens-taxplan-would-pull-the-rug-out-from-under-the-real-estate-industry-insiders/
[https://penna.cc/XQC7EVNM].
209. Fact Check: Biden's Address to the DNC, Annotated, NPR (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/20/901380014/fact-check-bidens-address-to-the-dnc-annotated
[https://perma.cc/FX6P-8FEZ].
210. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan (Apr. 28,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-theamerican-families-plan/ [https://perma.cc/8S8W-F6SP] ("The President would also end the special real
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movement in the wake of the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna
Taylor, among others-with its emphasis on redirecting scarce government

resources toward social goods and services, like education, healthcare, and,
prominently, affordable housing-also may contribute to a favorable political
climate for such change. 211
On the other hand, the FEA responded promptly to Biden's support for
§ 1031 reform, noting that it had already begun vigorous lobbying of members
of Congress on the issue. 212 In March 2021, a number of real estate trade groups,

including the National Association of Home Builders, the National Association
of Realtors, and the National Apartment Association, sent Treasury Secretary
Janet Yellen a letter arguing for the preservation of § 1031 in the face of the

estate tax break that allows real estate investors to defer taxation when they exchange property for
gains greater than $500,000 .... "). The plan would raise the exemption to $1 million for married
taxpayers filing jointly. See Lynn Mucenski Keck, Like-Kind Exchanges to Be Limited Under Biden 's
Tax
Proposals,
FORBES
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.foibes.com/sites/lynnmucenskikeck/2021/06/30/like-kind-exchanges-to-be-limitedunder-bidens-tax-proposals/?sh=4c5cbabf229d [https://perma.cc/P3MR-697T].
211. See Francisco P6rez & Luis Feliz Leon, Calls to Defund the PoliceAre Joiningthe Demand
to Cancel Rent, JACOBIN (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/08/defund-the-policecancel-rent-housing [https://perma.cc/LX93-FMBL] (discussing the relationship between policing and
housing needs in New York, and quoting Michael Velarde, "a Chicano labor and community organizer"
who stated, "The New York Police Department's budget is dramatically outsized when compared to
[the New York City Housing Authority] . .. [and] decades of investment in the police, as well as
neoliberal cuts to social spending more broadly, have resulted in over $45 billion in essential repairs
owed to NYCHA residents"). For an example of recent housing organizing and advocacy that garnered
widespread national attention, see Erin Baldassari & Molly Solomon, How Moms 4 Housing Changed
Laws and Inspired a Movement, KQED (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.kged.org/news/11842392/howmoms-4-housing-changed-laws-and-inspired-a-movement [https://perma.cc/5EG9-C3FY] (describing
how the activism of Bay Area mothers who occupied an empty home sparked a number of legislative
proposals addressing the shortage of affordable housing).
212. See Lynn Harkin, FFA Continues Work to Preserve Section 1031 as Biden Campaign
Targets Like-Kind Exchanges, FED'N EXCH. ACCOMMODATORS
(Aug.
11, 2020),
https://www.1031taxreform.com/fea-continues-work-to-preserve-section-1031-as-biden-campaigntargets-like-kind-exchanges/ [https://perma.cc/AR9D-2PQ4] ("In anticipation of this kind of
announcement, FEA has been advocating for the preservation of Section 1031 withkey Biden supporters
in a number of ways.... In recent weeks, we have met virtually with key members of Congress,
including key members of the Senate and House tax-writing committees to discuss the economic
importance of like-kind exchanges.... FEA's Government Affairs Committee, along with our lobbying
partners at Williams and Jensen, is working with a coalition of real estate industry associations to update
the ground-breaking 2015 studies on the economic stimulus provided by Section 1031 like-kind
exchanges and the negative impact to the US economy that would ensue from elimination of this
important and valuable tax tool.").
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Biden administration's review of the tax code. 213 It thus appears that the next

round of political struggle over like-kind exchanges is underway. 214
With respect to the Opportunity Zone program, the most immediate

economic benefits of the program will naturally expire in 2026. Of course, the
end of the program could be hastened. Representative Rashida Tlaib introduced
legislation proposing exactly that. 215 In introducing the Repeal Opportunity
Zones Act of 2019, she stated:

The American people have been scammed by Opportunity Zones....
Opportunity

Zones

were

supposed

to

help

uplift

low-income

communities and those living in poverty, but instead we are seeing them
benefit billionaires and their luxury projects. Our communities deserve
resources and programs with proven track records to thrive - the current
Opportunity Zone law fails to drive real benefits to low-income
communities, instead often rewarding President Trump's donors. We
must repeal them to stop yet another form of corporate greed from
hurting our communities and tarnishing our democracy. 216
Thus far, however, the Biden administration appears to be more inclined to
amend rather than eliminate the program. 2 17
3.

PsychologicalChallenges

As a final note, it is worth pausing to reflect upon a couple psychological
barriers to the proposal to massively expand direct financial assistance in the
form of housing vouchers to all eligible extremely low-income households. Even
for those who would disavow Porter's market-based ideology-that the "inner
213. See Letter from ADISA Alt. & Direct Inv. Sec. Ass'n, Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Am.
Hotel & Lodging Ass'n, Am. Land Title Ass'n, Am. Resort Dev. Ass'n, Asian Am. Hotel Owners Ass'n,
Building Owners & Managers Ass'n (BOMA) Int'l, CCIM Inst., Com. Real Est. Fin. Council, Fed'n of
Exch. Accommodators, Forest Landowners Ass'n, Inst. forPortfolio Alts., Inst. of Real Est. Mgmt., Int'l
Council of Shopping Ctrs., Land Trust All., Latino Hotel Ass'n, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, NAIOP, the
Com. Real Est. Dev. Ass'n, Nareit, Nat'l Alliance of Forest Owners, Nat'l Apartment Ass'n, Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders, Nat'l Ass'n of Black Hotel Owners, Operators and Developers, NAT'L ASS'N OF
REALTORS®, Nat'l Cattlemen's Beef Ass'n, Nat'l Council of Farmer Coops., Nat'l Multifamily Hous.
Council, REALTORS® Land Inst., The Conservation Fund, The Nature Conservancy, The Real Est.
Roundtable
to
Janet L.
Yellen,
Sec'y
of the
Treasury
(Mar.
16, 2021),
https://www.icsc.com/uploads/t07-subpage/CoalitionLettertoTreasury_SecretaryYellen.pdf

[https://perma.cc/XSJ6-VKRZ].
214.

See Joe Gose, Investors Fret as Biden Takes Aim at a 100-Year-Old Tax Loophole, N.Y.

TIMES (June 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/business/like-kind-real-estate-taxloophole.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/D65D-PZRF] (discussing the politics of
§ 1031 reform).
215. See H.R. 5252, 116th Cong. (2019).
216. Press Release, Rashid Tlaib, House of Representatives, Congresswoman Rashid Tlaib
Introduces
Bill to
Repeal
Controversial
Opportunity
Zones
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://tlaib.house.gov/media/press-releases/congresswoman-rashida-tlaib-introduces-bill-repealcontroversial-opportunity [https://penna.cc/Z447-AF45].
217. See The Biden Planfor Investing in Our Communities Through Housing, supra note 196
(laying out steps to revise Opportunity Zones, including incentivizing partnering with non-profit
organizations, greater Treasury Department oversight, and enhanced reporting and public disclosure).
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city's crippling social problems" could be solved primarily by letting business
do business-there often lingers the trace of an unspoken, yet related sentiment:
that direct government aid to individuals and households in need is at best a
temporary but necessary evil, and that the goal is eventually for all individuals
to take personal responsibility for their own housing outcomes.
When a pandemic strikes, leading to record-breaking levels of
unemployment, it is easy to see how one's circumstances prevent the ability to
take personal responsibility for housing outcomes and to rationalize government
intervention. But when subtle yet powerful changes to the structure of the
economy occur-such that it becomes essentially impossible to afford decent
housing on available wages-it takes a more discerning look to understand that
one is equally constrained by the situation. In the face of natural disasters, when,
for example, a family's home is blown away in a storm, we assume that disaster
relief is appropriate. 218 But when one's livelihood is slowly whittled away by

real wages year after year failing to keep pace with real rents, the mantra of
personal responsibility is prone to reappear. Our federal housing policy thus
limps along, providing woefully inadequate levels of support reflecting
ambivalence about whether aid is warranted.
Attributing to the individual disposition what is more accurately causally
connected with situational forces is a long-established psychological
phenomenon. 219 Hopefully the lesson of COVID-19 will not be that a once-in-alifetime pandemic gave rise to a once-in-a-lifetime need for serious government
housing assistance, but rather that the pandemic magnified and encouraged an
empathic understanding of the ways in which a large swath of society already
lived in seriously constrained situations.
Another barrier to significant rental assistance expansion is the
psychological tendency to protect the status quo. System justification theory
posits an innate human psychological motive to defend and rationalize the

218. For a related point in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, see Jon Hanson & Kathleen
Hanson, The Blame Frame:Justifying (Racial)Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
454-55 (2006) ("Although seeing through the illusion of choice is uncommon, it does happen.
Perceiving situational influences can sometimes even be easy particularly when situation is salient,
when acknowledging situation enhances (or at least does not threaten) our sense of ourselves or our
system, or when no powerful interests have a stake in framing the matter as 'choice.' But it takes an
extraordinary event indeed to pierce the veil of choice and reveal the influence of situational forces when
doing so opens the possibility that something horribly unfair is afoot. A 'natural disaster' is just such an
extraordinary event." (internal citations omitted)).
219. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The SituationalCharacter:A CriticalRealist Perspective
on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 n.6 (2004) (discussing the origins of the "fundamental attribution
error" in the social psychology literature and citing LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON
AND THE SITUATION 4 (1983) ("People's inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and
dispositions, together with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting
behavior, has been termed the 'fundamental attribution error. "')).
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current system, even by those it disadvantages. 220 The Opportunity Zone
program strikes a deeply resonant chord in this respect in that it embodies notions
about how our system is supposed to work-the notion of a largely market
economy unfettered by intrusive government intervention. Porter's ideology has
been so influential for its resonance with this idea.
The prospect of providing widespread rental assistance creates tension with

this free-market ideology that lies at the core of the American psyche. One
approach with less tension would be to keep the broad market-based structure of
the Opportunity Zone program in place but to amend certain features to make it

work better. As discussed in Part IB, we might require investment in the
development of more necessary community assets; incentivize partnering with

local stewards, for example, mission-driven community-based organizations;
insist upon local hiring requirements and preferences for disadvantaged business
enterprises; demand greater transparency and governmental accountability; and
tighten up the geographical requirements to ensure investments are made in lowincome communities. All such reforms would be welcome-one could imagine
a well-designed Opportunity Zone program that reflects the best lessons the field
of community economic development has learned to date. Place-based
approaches that leverage market forces to help redress poverty remain critically
important and do not stand in opposition to approaches that alternatively provide
individuals options for mobility.
Yet, in the current environment, with such dire housing needs-both pre-

and post-pandemic-more immediate and widespread support is needed as a
complementary strategy. While inclusive economic development initiatives
continue to further systemic approaches to developing a more inclusive market
economy, direct relief is necessary immediately. And economic development
initiatives alone aimed at spurring job growth will never address all the need.
Individuals with disabilities and the elderly, for example, are among the largest
categories of those served by federal rental assistance.22i Their need for
assistance will not disappear even were the market economy to become more
broadly inclusive.

220.

See, e.g., John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System

Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status

Quo, 25 POL. PSYCH. 881, 887 ("We argue that there is a general (but not insurmountable) system
justification motive to defend and justify the status quo and to bolster the legitimacy of the existing social
order. Such a motive is not unique to members of dominant groups.").
221.

See

CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,

POLICY BASICS: FEDERAL RENTAL

ASSISTANCE 2 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-housing-1-2513RA.pdf [https://penna.cc/8FQC-YJ45] (noting that of all households receiving federal rental
assistance, 36 percent are headed by a person age sixty-two or older, and a separate 24 percent are adults
with disabilities).
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CONCLUSION

Contrary to former President Trump's frequent praise of the program,

Opportunity Zones will not be the elixir that he claims for economically
distressed communities. Bad apples aside, the program is based on an overly
simplistic model that fails to ensure that valuable economic incentives accrue to
the benefit of anyone other than taxpayers with capital gains to shield. Beyond
mere inefficacy, the program holds the potential to accelerate harmful
neighborhood change.
A comparison of Opportunity Zones with § 1031 exchanges highlights
similarities between the two tax shelters and how taxpayers are likely to
approach them. Yet the underlying purposes of the two provisions are different.
For the former, the stated rationale is relatively clear. By contrast, a variety of
shifting justifications has been used to support § 1031. Yet none of the primary
ones-measurement, administrability, liquidity, or economic productivityprovides a satisfactory defense of its modern incarnation.
No doubt the U.S. tax code is riddled with tax shelters that are worthy of
reexamination. Larger discussions of comprehensive tax reform will continue.
The aim of this Article has been a more modest one-to consider how the value
of two particular tax expenditures could be better spent elsewhere. The United
States falls woefully short in providing housing assistance to income-eligible
households given a lack of resources. Yet relatively modest shifts to the tax code,
and the values it enshrines, could solve this problem in a manner that furthers the
purported goals of the Opportunity Zone program.

A massive expansion of the Housing Choice Voucher program will not
solve all U.S. housing insecurity. Broader housing policy debates have raged for
decades as we continually refine the toolkit available for nuanced government
intervention. Yet ensuring as a baseline that all extremely low-income
households have the means to afford decent housing would be a significant step
forward. Given the disproportionate housing challenges faced by low-income
households and households of color, a universal voucher for extremely lowincome households would be a program truly worthy of praise for helping to
alleviate the ills of poverty and racial inequity.

